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The power to redraw electoral lines is the power to design elections.
Enormous significance therefore attaches to any delegation of redistricting
authority. Yet in every jurisdiction in the country, the power to redistrict has
been delegated to a varied collection of actors whose participation largely has
escaped academic attention. They are as ubiquitous as they are overlooked: they
are the redistricting litigants. These actors’ participation in the process leads to
a startling form of redistricting. Though the majority of these litigants are not
elected, appointed, or in any way vetted by the electorate at large, they are
empowered to affect electoral lines in deliberate and politically consequential
ways; to affect the rights of non-parties without providing class-action
protections or other defenses; and to exploit a procedural regime that, due to the
time pressures of the election cycle, becomes warped in ways that give litigants
significant leverage to advance their own agendas. These features reflect a
regime developed not through deliberate design, but rather through the
accidental effects of judicial intervention. This Article responds to the persistent
gap in the literature by revealing the unacknowledged power of redistricting
litigants. It identifies the concerns their participation raises with respect to the
outcomes, efficiency, and legitimacy of the redistricting process, and it concludes
with a discussion of targeted reforms. These reforms include institutional
adjustments meant to reduce reliance on litigants and procedural changes meant
to give greater voice to non-parties.
INTRODUCTION
Redistricting has a technical definition: the redrawing of electoral district
boundaries. Yet scholars often describe the practice in far more colorful terms.
Redistricting is the “bloodsport of politics,”1 an opportunity for “political
players [to] game the system,”2 or, simply, “war.”3 These characterizations
attempt to capture what the definition lacks, which is an acknowledgment that
the drawing of electoral boundaries has profound political and practical
implications. The power to redistrict is the power to affect fundamental
democratic design, for elections are influenced, and even decided by, the shape
1

T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 588 (1993).
2 Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J.
1808, 1836 (2012).
3 Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 1379, 1381 (2012) (referring to the “redistricting wars”).
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of particular districts.4 The understandable result is intense academic scrutiny
directed at which individuals and institutions should be empowered to
redistrict. To this end, scholars have debated the relative merits of courts over
legislatures,5 legislatures over commissions,6 and commissions over courts,7
among other formulations.8 An emerging body of scholarship – a burgeoning
“new election law institutionalism” – has advanced these debates even further.9

4

See infra note 21.
Compare, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 643-45 (2002) (“[T]he Court should forbid ex ante the participation of selfinterested insiders [such as legislators] in the redistricting process, instead of trying to police
redistricting outcomes ex post.”); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 83 (2004) (“Courts should not be idealized as
institutional guarantors against inevitable democratic pathologies, but they are the primary
American institution capable under current circumstances of addressing the central
structural problem of self-entrenchment.”), with Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes
Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting
Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 680-81 (2002) (rejecting Professor Issacharoff’s
thesis and arguing instead that redistricting should be conducted by the “admittedly selfinterested but more accountable political bodies”). For other works exploring the choice
between courts and legislatures, see, for example, Michael A. Carvin & Louis K. Fisher, A
“Legislative Task”: Why Four Types of Redistricting Challenges Are Not, or Should Not Be,
Recognized by Courts, 4 ELECTION L.J. 2, 42-43 (2005), and Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S.
Karlan, Where to Draw the Line: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 541, 578 (2004).
6
Compare, e.g., Persily, supra note 5, at 678-79 (“[A]ssuming that we could find a
philosopher king whom we could trust both to develop and to apply neutral redistricting
principles, we should still hesitate to embrace such a method for determining the building
blocks of legislative representation. . . . Through redistricting, legislatures not only make the
tough value-laden decisions as to how communities should be represented, but they create
service relationships between representatives and constituents that fit into larger public
policy programs.”), with Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 644 (“Various approaches to
nonpartisan redistricting, such as blue-ribbon commissions, panels of retired judges, and
Iowa’s computer-based models, recommend themselves as viable alternatives to the proincumbent status quo.”). See generally Heather K. Gerken, The Double-Edged Sword of
Independence: Inoculating Electoral Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics, 6
ELECTION L.J. 184, 184 (2007).
7 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605,
1611 (1999).
8 See, e.g., Justin Levitt, Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOYOLA L.A.
L. REV. 513, 522-42 (2011) (analyzing alternatives to incumbent control of the redistricting
process); see also JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
REDISTRICTING 23 (2010) [hereinafter LEVITT, CITIZEN’S GUIDE], available at http://brennan.
3cdn.net/cdefaa72f3179649cb_pqm6b404v.pdf (describing proposals in which “computers
draw the lines using automated algorithms,” or “members of the public [submit] plans to be
judged purely on quantitative criteria”).
9 See Cain, supra note 2, at 1843.
5
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These discussions are of tremendous value. But they are incomplete. Despite
their foundation in institutional competence and design, they fail to take into
adequate account – and often fail even to acknowledge – the pivotal role
played each redistricting cycle by a separate set of agents: the redistricting
litigants.10 Members of this group are empowered, in every jurisdiction across
the country, to affect electoral lines in ways that are legally sanctioned and
politically consequential. Yet their participation attracts almost no sustained
scholarly attention.
A more careful look at litigants’ influence over redistricting confirms the
timeliness and importance of exploring the implications of this phenomenon. As
of the date that members of the 113th Congress – including many elected
pursuant to the most recent round of redistricting – were sworn in, nearly 200
redistricting-related cases had been filed following the 2010 Census.11 This
litigation already had had an enormous effect on democratic design across the
country, as courts in over a dozen states had rejected plans that were designed,
whether recently or in a prior redistricting cycle, by state legislatures or
redistricting commissions, and within that set, over half had redrawn the
district lines themselves.12 And the effect was far from finished: some sixty
cases still remained active.13
A more careful look at how litigants have driven and otherwise affected this
process reveals a host of questions and concerns. Although redistricting
litigants benefit from a significant delegation of redistricting authority, most of
these actors are never elected, appointed, or in any way vetted by the electorate
at large. Their participation in redistricting is transparent only in the most
nominal sense. Litigants nevertheless enjoy a privileged position in the
redistricting process, one that accords them a procedural regime
accommodating of their preferences, even when that accommodation affects
redistricting outcomes; an ability to affect the rights of non-parties without
providing protections that would be required in a class-action setting; and an
unusual jumble of timing-based rules that gives redistricting litigants significant
leverage to advance their own agendas. The consequences of such participation
are far-reaching, as nearly all redistricting-related reforms implicitly rely on
litigants for implementation or enforcement, and reliance on these actors may
compromise the very purpose of such efforts. Litigant participation also raises
difficult questions of legitimacy, questions that cannot be adequately
considered, much less addressed, without critical scrutiny.

10

By “agent,” this Article means to refer to “[s]omething that produces an effect,” not
necessarily “[o]ne who is authorized to act for or in place of another.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 72 (9th ed. 2009).
11 Justin Levitt, Litigation in the 2010 Cycle, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricti
ng.lls.edu/cases.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
12 Id.
13 Id.
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Despite these concerns, a gap in the literature is perhaps to be expected.
Litigation over matters of public importance is hardly unusual, and, as a result,
it may not be clear why redistricting litigants should warrant special attention,
particularly when many of the features of redistricting litigation have analogs
in other litigation contexts. Moreover, not all scholarship ignores redistricting
litigants; some simply conflates litigants with the courts before which they
appear. This conflation has a certain logic to it: litigants cannot affect district
lines directly but instead must do so through judicial mediators. With election
law scholars already analyzing the participation of courts in the redistricting
process, perhaps there is no need to subject redistricting litigants to separate
scrutiny.
This Article fights against such conclusions. It seeks to reveal how the
practice of litigating as redistricting, which has evolved into a form of
litigation highly susceptible to procedural manipulation, has created a type of
redistricting that grants profound power to those who choose to litigate. In so
doing, this Article rejects any understanding of the redistricting process that
understands the influence of litigants to be somehow negated or neutralized by
the involvement of courts.14 It recognizes, moreover, that many of the defining
features of redistricting litigation – which are, in certain respects, analogous to
those characterizing other problematic forms of litigation – nevertheless reflect
some of the most startling effects of applying the trans-substantive norm of
civil procedure to extraordinary causes of action.15 These effects stem in part
from what is at stake. Redistricting through litigation has far-reaching and even
multiplied effects on the public interest, as challenges to state-imposed
redistricting regimes affect the composition of the legislatures that enact future
statutes. Moreover, these effects are neither rare nor random, arising at
unpredictable times in an unpredictable fashion. Redistricting litigation instead
occurs with clocklike regularity every redistricting cycle,16 with jurisdictions
across the country relying on this form of litigation to ensure legality and
simply when necessary to overcome legislative deadlock.17 In other words, the
effects of redistricting litigation are profound – and predictably so.
In exploring the implications of these observations, this Article initiates the
project of subjecting litigant participation in redistricting to the scrutiny it
warrants. Part I begins with an introduction of redistricting litigants. It
identifies several traits that best characterize these actors, a group whose
composition is heterogeneous, ad hoc, and largely self-selected. It situates

14 Quite to the contrary, redistricting litigants exercise important control over the judicial
actors meant to mediate their participation. See infra Part II.A.1.b-c, A.3.
15 Cf. David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal
Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 373 (2010) (“The pressures of complexity and
specialization, among other developments, have imperiled the trans-substantivity principle
as a bulwark of federal civil procedure.”).
16 See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
17 See infra Part I.B.2.
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these actors as critical participants in the redistricting process but as virtual
non-entities in the existing literature. After identifying the stakes implicated by
this unusual combination, Part I confirms that litigant participation will
become no less critical to the redistricting process in the foreseeable future.
The delegation of authority to litigants instead promises to remain as central to
the redistricting process as it has been for now half a century.18
Part II reveals the consequences. It demonstrates how the delegation of
authority operates through a form of litigation subject to significant control by
litigants. At the outset, redistricting through litigation offers a flexible and
forgiving regime to those electing to litigate, with a standing doctrine able to
accommodate anyone – that is, anyone of sufficient resources and adequate
motivation – wishing to participate in the redistricting process; a venue regime
that provides extraordinary rewards for parties trying to secure a preferred
judge; and flexibility in claim selection that permits litigants to set the courts’
agendas in powerful and consequential ways. Yet at the same time redistricting
litigation is so hospitable to litigants, it offers remarkably few protections to
non-litigants. A striking example of aggregative litigation packaged as an
individual lawsuit, redistricting litigation seems like the sort that should be
subjected to class-action-style protections. But it is not. Compounding this
neglect of non-parties is a shifting regime of legal standards that courts have
developed in response to the exigencies of the election cycle. This unusual
compression of civil procedure gives litigants significant control over several
fundamental aspects of the process, including the balance of power among
redistricting agents, the standards for relief, and the timing of court-imposed
remedies.
Combined, these features produce a procedural regime ripe for
manipulation by litigants. This, in turn, produces an unexpected form of
redistricting – one that grants sweeping power to actors who are not
representative of the general electorate and that requires them to exercise
power through opaque and indirect means. These features reflect a
redistricting regime developed not through deliberate effort, but rather through
the accidental effects of judicial intervention. It reveals a startling model of
democratic design.
Such a regime raises normative concerns. Part III identifies the questions
that litigant participation raises with respect to fundamental qualities of the
redistricting process, including its outcomes, efficiency, and legitimacy.
These concerns urge a more thoughtful delegation of democratic design. To
this end, the Article discusses potential reforms that may help to advance two
general goals: improved representativeness and reduced opportunity for
procedural manipulation by litigants. At the forefront of these proposals are
institutional adjustments meant to reduce reliance on litigants and procedural
changes meant to give greater voice to non-parties. These discussions, which
18 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding for the first time that plaintiffs
challenging legislative reapportionment had presented a justiciable claim).
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come fifty years after the Supreme Court first transformed litigants into agents
of redistricting,19 are long overdue.
I.

INTRODUCING THE REDISTRICTING LITIGANTS

Identifying the agents of redistricting – including the litigants who play such
a pivotal role – is critical, at the very outset, because redistricting matters, and
it matters who redistricts. When asserted at a high level of generality, these
broad propositions elicit little controversy. Indeed, it has become “a core
understanding in American politics . . . that geographically districted elections
are subject to ends-oriented manipulation.”20 Perhaps the most vivid
illustration occurs when an election outcome is unmistakably affected by the
shape of electoral districts,21 although often the effect is more subtle. Even
when districts have equal populations, “[t]he choice to draw a district line one
way, not another, always carries some consequence for politics.”22 In short,
different maps generate different elections. And different elections have at
least the potential to generate different politicians.23 It therefore matters how
electoral maps are drawn – and, by extension, who is empowered to do the
drawing.
The identity of the map-drawers matters for at least two reasons. First, the
task of redistricting is in no sense ministerial. Quite to the contrary,
redistricting requires the exercise of enormous discretion, with maps generally
susceptible to numerous variations, each with its own set of electoral
19

See id.
Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 595.
21 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 466 (2006)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing how, under one district plan, if members of a given
political party won 50% of the statewide vote, they would be likely to win twenty of thirtytwo congressional seats, whereas, under another plan, they would be likely to win only
sixteen); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 358-59 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Given a
fairly large state population with a fairly large congressional delegation, districts assigned so
as to be perfectly random in respect to politics would translate a small shift in political
sentiment, say a shift from 51% Republican to 49% Republican, into a seismic shift in the
makeup of the legislative delegation, say from 100% Republican to 100% Democrat.”);
Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE
L.J. 2505, 2553-54 (1997) (“Recent cases now document in microscopic detail the
astonishing precision with which redistricters can carve up individual precincts and
distribute them between districts with confidence concerning the racial and partisan
consequences.”).
22
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting).
23 The shape of electoral districts can affect which politicians get elected. See supra note
21. It has also been suggested that the shape of electoral districts can affect how politicians
then govern. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (“When a district obviously
is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected
officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the
members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole.”).
20
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consequences.24 There is, as a result, almost always the potential for those in
charge of redistricting meaningfully to affect district boundaries. Second, the
legitimacy of the redistricting process may depend in part on who is
empowered to draw the electoral maps.25 This legitimacy (or lack of
legitimacy) may go so far as to affect those elected pursuant to those maps,26 in
which case the identity of the map-drawers takes on even greater importance.
These concerns are reflected in a voluminous literature debating the relative
merits of empowering certain actors over others.27 Yet as discussed in more
detail below,28 the existing scholarship has overlooked a critical group of
participants: the thousands of individuals who have affected district maps
through resort to litigation. The redistricting process accommodates, and even
relies on, these litigants to ensure the timely implementation of district lines.
While it is true that these agents cannot directly change map lines, but rather
must act by influencing those who are so empowered, they nevertheless are
able to exercise significant control over redistricting through efforts that are
authorized and facilitated by the legal system itself.
The following discussion, which introduces redistricting litigants and
provides an overview of the redistricting process, helps to situate litigants in
this regime and to confirm the pivotal role they play.
A.

Who the Redistricting Litigants Are

Redistricting litigants – a term this Article uses broadly to include not only
the parties nominally named in litigation, but also those operating (often
behind the scenes) to control, fund, or otherwise drive redistricting litigation –
share certain definitional commonalities.29 They all pursue the same ultimate
24

See Micah Altman, The Computational Complexity of Automated Redistricting: Is
Automation the Answer?, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 81, 98 (1997) (“For even a
small number of census tracts and districts, the number of possible districting arrangements
is enormous.”).
25 Legitimacy, in this context, may be understood as reflecting various meanings,
including the public’s perceived obligation to, and support of, legal authority. See TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 27-28 (1990). This Article, which seeks to raise
questions of legitimacy as they relate to the participation of litigants in the redistricting
process, does not go so far as to answer these difficult inquiries. An excellent exploration
and critique of the use of legitimacy-based arguments in the field of election law can be
found in Christopher S. Elmendorf, Empirical Legitimacy and Election Law, in RACE,
REFORM, AND REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
117 (Heather K. Gerken, Guy Uriel E. Charles & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011).
26 See Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 605-06 (describing certain Supreme Court cases as
“ground[ing] the legitimacy of the exercise of governmental power in the fairness and
propriety of the electoral process itself”).
27 See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
28 See infra Part I.C.
29 The term “redistricting litigants,” for purposes of this Article, at times encompasses a
particularly important class of individuals exercising control over the litigation: the lawyers.
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goal: to affect the shape of electoral districts. They all must act through a
judicial mediator, as they lack authority to draw district lines directly. What is
more, as this Article seeks to reveal, they all enjoy a privileged role in the
redistricting process, for they all operate within a legal system that
accommodates, facilitates, and even relies on their efforts when determining
district lines.30
Beyond these broad generalities, however, redistricting litigants can be
difficult to describe. As a strictly formal matter, of course, litigants are quickly
recognized; their names are a matter of public record, and they generally are
suing in their capacity as voters in the districts they are challenging, for it is
this quality that most reliably accords them standing.31 Beyond these
informational tidbits, however, there is little in the public sphere that describes
the nature of redistricting litigants or identifies their motivations. This lack of
transparency is in part due to lax disclosure regimes. Redistricting litigants
face no set requirement that they inform the court, much less the public, about
the motivations or the funding behind their lawsuits. Transparency also tends
to be undermined by the rules for getting into court. In order to secure standing, redistricting litigants normally must reside in the district they seek to
challenge.32 While this requirement might seem to impose a significant
limitation on which parties get to participate in redistricting litigation, it in fact
is easily circumvented by those willing to find litigant proxies.33 In a sense,
therefore, the standing requirements create an incentive for actors to participate
in redistricting litigation at one degree removed, through an arrangement
whereby voters in the relevant district serve as the nominal litigants. This twotiered arrangement means that the minimal information contained in the
complaints is at best incomplete.
Despite such challenges, one can make an educated guess about the
composition of litigants in any given lawsuit. Usually, those most likely to be
appearing before a judge – either directly or through a litigant proxy – are
those with significant financial backing and the most directly at stake. This
tends to include major political parties, prominent interest groups, and, if the
stakes are high enough, an individual legislator or some splinter faction from a
political party. Parsing through the litigants in select cases tends to confirm this
intuition.34

Lawyers necessarily are implicated, for example, whenever the Article discusses litigation
strategies. While this Article generally does not differentiate among these different classes
of “litigants” (that is, among the nominal litigants, those operating behind the scenes, and
the lawyers who represent either or both of them), the ways in which these actors’ interests
overlap and diverge is an underexplored topic that warrants further analysis.
30 For an overview, see infra Part I.B.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-45 (1995).
32 See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
34 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, The Elysian Fields of the Law, 57
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It also is possible to classify redistricting litigants in terms that are more
general but still revealing. To this end, the composition of this group can be
described as heterogeneous, ad hoc, and, for the most part, self-selected. As a
closer examination of these traits confirms, there is little reason to conclude
that this group represents all the interests implicated by redistricting.
At the outset, redistricting litigants as a group are heterogeneous with
respect to their affiliations, motivations, and levels of competence. A
redistricting plaintiff, for example, may be associated with any number of
groups, including political parties, political factions, minority groups, or other
interest groups. Occasionally, a plaintiff will proceed on his own behalf, as
may be the case with respect to individual politicians or other civic-minded
individuals. On the defense side, a redistricting litigant normally proceeds in
his or her capacity as a state actor (frequently, as secretary of state, the official
whom most redistricting litigants are required by law to sue).35 Even on the
defense side, however, there is meaningful diversity: there very well may be
outside parties – such as political parties or interest groups – driving litigation
nominally pursued by a state actor.36
Given the diversity of affiliations, it is perhaps not surprising that
redistricting litigants, as a group, also are heterogeneous in their motivations.
At the highest level of generality, redistricting litigants want to affect electoral
lines, and they tend to be driven by discrete concerns, often relating to a certain
politician, cause, or political party. Beyond this, however, litigants on both the
plaintiffs’ side and the defense side tend to have complex motivations,
sometimes seemingly at odds with the positions they take in their cases. This is
due in part to the inherent complexity of redistricting litigation. Many of the
legal issues, forms of proof, and predictions regarding electoral consequences
are extraordinarily complicated. As a result, it often is necessary for litigants to
rely not on ideological preferences or party platforms, but rather on lawyers
and data experts to determine which legal positions to advance. Coupled with
the intricate political dances and shifting alliances that dictate the particular
goals litigants decide to pursue, the result is that legal positions may shift in the
course of a single redistricting cycle; litigants affiliated with the same political
STAN. L. REV. 695, 710 (2004) (“Even if the plaintiffs themselves are not political activists –
and often they are – the lawsuits are nearly always financed and run by political parties.”).
But see Robinson O. Everett, Redistricting in North Carolina – A Personal Perspective, 79
N.C. L. REV. 1301, 1315 (2000) (describing litigation brought by individuals not affiliated
with established political actors). See generally STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND:
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY (2007)
(describing political players involved in redistricting in Texas).
35 Occasionally, the government itself even might serve as a litigant, as when the United
States sues to enforce federal law or a state sues the federal government to receive the
preclearance required by the Voting Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6 (2006).
36 See, e.g., BICKERSTAFF, supra note 34 (describing efforts by Republican national
politicians, including Congressman Tom DeLay, to design and defend a mid-cycle
redistricting of the state’s congressional districts).
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party may take opposite legal positions in different jurisdictions; and parties
may take positions that appear contrary to type. A Republican-backed group,
for example, might decide to join individual Democratic legislators in
advocating for certain majority-minority districts, given the possibility of
constructing a map that shields both the individual legislators and Republican
incumbents.37 The legal positions taken during litigation are only loose proxies
for a litigant’s more complicated underlying motivations.
Finally, there is significant diversity in litigants’ levels of competence.
Some are represented by preeminent experts in the field, lawyers and
specialists with decades of redistricting experience. Others proceed pro se.
There is, moreover, evidence to suggest that large amounts of money recently
have been poured into groups funding redistricting litigation and other
redistricting efforts.38 Yet not all litigants benefit from this funding.39 As a
result of these discrepancies, courtroom adversaries may be mismatched in
competence.
The diversity among litigants should not, however, be mistaken for an
organized attempt to ensure broad representation. That would imply a
centralized system that does not exist. This absence goes to the second central
trait defining redistricting litigants: the ad hoc nature of their composition.
Beyond the requirement that certain state actors be named as defendants, there
is virtually no regulation affecting whose interests are represented.40 The scope
of representation instead is a result of case-by-case decisionmaking by
potential litigants. Determinations regarding who will serve as redistricting
litigants, in other words, are not driven in any systematic fashion; they instead
are a reflection of decentralized decisionmaking by a disparate collection of
individuals and organizations. Although this ad hoc approach to representation
may be typical in certain forms of civil litigation, it deviates from the approach
employed in other prominent forms of litigation (such as that used in class
actions),41 it reflects a markedly lenient set of standing rules,42 and it takes on a
particular significance in the redistricting context.43

37 See, e.g., Olga Pierce et al., The Hidden Hands in Redistricting: Corporations and
Other Powerful Interests, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 23, 2011, 8:03 AM), http://www.propublica.or
g/article/hidden-hands-in-redistricting-corporations-special-interests.
38 See, e.g., Cynthia Burton, Center for a Better New Jersey Funding Is a Mystery,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 15, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-02-15/news/28536244_1_a
pportionment-commission-redrawing-district-boundaries; Pierce et al., supra note 37.
39 See, e.g., Everett, supra note 34, at 1315 (describing financial difficulties encountered
in litigation against a state).
40 As discussed below, although standing doctrines exist, they have little practical effect.
See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
41 See infra Part II.A.2.
42 See infra Part II.A.1.a.
43 See infra Part II.B.
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This, in turn, relates to the final central trait of redistricting litigants, which
is that they are, for the most part, self-selected. Like most plaintiffs,
redistricting plaintiffs choose whether to join a lawsuit, and that decision is
entirely voluntary. In the redistricting context, this means that the conversion
from a non-participant to an important agent of redistricting is based on a
litigant’s own initiative, not because the law affirmatively has assigned the
litigant this role.44 There is, as a corollary, no public selection process or
vetting of those who choose to participate.45 There is not even any requirement
of transparency with respect to these actors.46 While there are exceptions –
most prominently, with respect to certain state actors, who often are required to
participate in the process as defendants47 – the majority of redistricting litigants
are private parties whose roles in the process are entirely voluntary and selfdirected.48
These three traits – heterogeneity, an ad hoc approach to representation, and
self-selection – define redistricting litigants. The result is a group of
participants that tends to represent not the electorate at large, but rather the
interests of established political actors, such as major political parties and
prominent interest groups. These are the actors who have been empowered to
take on the quintessentially public task of redistricting.

44 In a very broad sense, of course, the law has assigned private litigants a role by
granting them standing to bring suit or intervene. This observation, while valid, fails to take
into account more subtle differences. Members of the private-litigant group have been
assigned no special role in the redistricting process (beyond their undifferentiated status as
voters), and they become participants in the redistricting process only if they voluntarily
elect to be.
45 The rare candid account by a redistricting litigant helps to illustrate this phenomenon.
See, e.g., Everett, supra note 34, at 1305 n.23, 1310 n.51, 1311 n.54 (describing litigants in
a prominent redistricting case as: a law professor spearheading the case on his own
initiative; that professor’s colleague, son, and secretary; and one “public-spirited Durham
citizen”); cf. id. at 1316 n.71 (referring to certain nominal litigants as “persons sponsored by
the organizations involved”).
46 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
47 See supra note 35 (noting that the government on occasion also will serve as a
litigant).
48 Nearly all redistricting plaintiffs are private parties (as those are the ones most likely to
have both standing and the motivation to sue), and in most redistricting lawsuits, the
plaintiffs greatly outnumber the defendants. In the litigation challenging district lines in
Texas, for example, there were, at one point, over fifty named plaintiffs, nearly all suing in
their individual capacities, and only seven named defendants, all being sued in their official
capacities. See Order at 1, Perez v. Texas, No. 11-CA-360 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2011),
available at https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxeOfQQnUr_gNWIxZmU1M2EtNDVhNS00
ZmI1LWFmMTktZWMzNmU1YmQ4MmMy/edit?hl=en.
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What the Redistricting Litigants Do

Although there is significant variation in the claims, strategies, and
procedural maneuvers adopted by redistricting litigants, these actors all operate
within the same legal framework. The nature of their involvement therefore
can be understood through a description of how the redistricting process
unfolds. As discussed in more detail below, redistricting litigants engage in an
important form of redistricting by participating in civil litigation, and they do
so during a particular stage of the process: what this Article refers to as
“fallback redistricting.”
1.

The Primary Tier of Redistricting Agents

In every jurisdiction, redistricting can be understood as a two-step process,
one that begins with the commencement of a “primary” form of redistricting
and that ends once all forms of “fallback” redistricting have been exhausted.
On the most fundamental level, what distinguishes these two forms of
redistricting is the identity of the agent engaged in redistricting. Litigants
represent one such agent, and their involvement in the process marks an
indispensable form of fallback redistricting. Notwithstanding the significant
variations among jurisdictions engaged in redistricting, this two-step
framework, and the role of litigants within it, holds true for all.
Identifying the primary tier of redistricting agents is relatively
straightforward. In each jurisdiction, the law expressly empowers a certain set
of actors to redistrict in the first instance. By definition, membership in this
preferred set is limited to those who are empowered by law to design district
lines that, in the absence of illegality, take precedence over all others. This
Article refers to this group as the “primary tier” of redistricting agents, and
their control over the process is significant.49
Prototypical members of the primary tier of redistricting agents are state
legislatures. These are the bodies normally empowered to enact the statutes
that set statewide district lines.50 In a minority of jurisdictions, state law has
replaced state legislatures with redistricting boards or commissions.51

49

For congressional elections, there is an even higher tier of primary redistricting agents:
the federal government. Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
authority to override any state regulations relating to congressional elections. U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 4. This added complexity does not change the basic framework, however, not least
of all because Article I, Section 4 expressly relies on state legislatures to control
redistricting in the absence of congressional action. Id.
50
In Alabama, for example, the state constitution expressly vests the state legislature
with authority to draw statewide electoral maps. ALA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 198-200. It is true
that in Alabama, as in many other states, the governor retains the ability to veto redistricting
legislation. Id. § 125. Although gubernatorial participation somewhat complicates the role of
legislatures as primary redistricting agents, it does not alter their status.
51 See generally LEVITT, CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 8, at 20-36. Within these
categories, there are important distinctions. Id. In California, for example, primary

576

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:563

Regardless of the particular form the primary agent takes, however, a
fundamental consistency remains: in each jurisdiction some set of agents
enjoys a preferred position in the redistricting process, which means that any
district lines they draw will govern, taking precedence over all other lines.
This power, while significant, is subject to an important limitation. If the
lines drawn by primary redistricting agents fail to comply with certain legal
restrictions, then other redistricting agents become empowered to alter them.52
These legal restrictions, which are identified in more detail below,53 are both
statutory and constitutional, both state-based and federal. These restrictions are
not, however, self-enforcing, and the remedies for their violation are not selfdefining. To the contrary, the task of enforcing these restrictions, and
designing remedies for their violation, falls on a distinct set of actors. It is at
this stage of the process that the next tier of redistricting agents wields its
influence.
2.

The Fallback Tier of Redistricting Agents

Primary redistricting agents do not always succeed in fulfilling their
mandate, which is to draw legal district lines.54 When they fail, the law
delegates to a different set of redistricting agents the ability to fill the gap –
that is, to design lines that will govern elections.55 Members of this latter group
serve, in a sense, as fallback redistricting agents, and this Article therefore
refers to them as members of the “fallback tier.”56
redistricting is now conducted by the fourteen commission members selected to serve on the
state’s “Citizens Redistricting Commission.” See CAL. CONST. art. 21, §§ 1-3; see also
Vandermost v. Bowen, 269 P.3d 446, 455-56 (Cal. 2012) (describing the commission).
52 These alterations can occur either directly, through courts redrawing the maps
themselves, or indirectly, through courts requiring that the primary redistricting agents make
certain changes. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. In addition, district lines can
be rejected or replaced through a separate mechanism in states that permits voter initiatives
or referenda. Although redistricting through direct voter action presents interesting issues
relating to process, outcomes, and legitimacy, the phenomenon is beyond the scope of this
Article.
53 See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
54 For a discussion of this mandate, see infra note 63 and accompanying text.
55 For a discussion of precisely what “law” empowers these agents, see infra notes 58, 60
and accompanying text.
56 This Article does not employ the term “fallback tier” either to imply passivity on the
part of its members or indicate a strict separation of roles between fallback and primary
redistricting agents. Members of the fallback tier actually may be one factor contributing to
the failure of primary redistricting agents to draw legal district lines. (Fallback-tier agents
might, for example, exert influence on primary-tier agents through the threat of litigation
creating legislative gridlock.) This Article instead relies on the term “fallback tier” because
it helps to illustrate the shifting stages that characterize redistricting in the United States. To
this end, it should be noted that fallback redistricting is distinct from the legislative practice
of incorporating “fallback” provisions into statutes to take effect if some original statutory
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Precisely what “law” effects this delegation of power derives from multiple
sources and to some extent depends on the jurisdiction. A straightforward
illustration exists in Illinois. The state constitution initially empowers the
legislature to draw certain districts following each decennial census conducted
by the federal government.57 If the legislature fails to enact a plan by a given
date, however, the constitution shifts power to a “Legislative Redistricting
Commission.”58 In other words, the commission becomes empowered to draw
lines when – and only when – the primary redistricting agents have failed to
complete the redistricting task.
While the Illinois Legislative Redistricting Commission provides a clear
illustration of a fallback redistricting agent, commissions are hardly the most
prominent of these actors.59 Instead, the delegation of authority falls most
commonly, and most importantly, to the courts. In every jurisdiction across the
country, and with respect to every district map, courts are poised to serve as
fallback redistricting agents.60 Necessarily accompanying these judicial actors
are the litigants. It is in this capacity that litigants serve as critical – indeed,
indispensable – fallback redistricting agents.
Fallback redistricting as a significant phenomenon has emerged largely as a
result of Baker v. Carr and its progeny.61 It is, in other words, largely a result
of the Supreme Court’s justiciability holdings, which, among other things,
introduced a new class of redistricting agents into the redistricting process. The
full effect of these precedents is even more dramatic. Through these decisions,
provision is later invalidated. See Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303.
304 (2007). The two phenomena nevertheless share fundamental similarities. Most
important, both respond to the threat of judicial review and invalidation by empowering a
court or other legally designated body, acting within a certain set of legally imposed
constraints, to respond to and remedy legal deficiencies. Viewed at a sufficiently high level
of generality, fallback redistricting in this sense may be considered a subset of what
Professor Dorf has termed “fallback law.” Cf. id. at 310.
57 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b).
58 See id.
59 Relatively few states have regimes analogous to that of Illinois. See LEVITT, CITIZEN’S
GUIDE, supra note 8, at 21.
60 The law granting courts this power derives in part from state constitutions and statutes
and in part from federal law. In Pennsylvania, for example, the state constitution expressly
permits challenges to be brought in the state supreme court and thereby empowers the court,
and therefore litigants, to engage in fallback redistricting. PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(d). In
numerous jurisdictions, general grants of jurisdiction permit the same – that is, they permit
litigants and state courts to engage in fallback redistricting through litigation and
adjudication of redistricting lawsuits. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 3. The federal
government also provides an important source of law empowering the fallback tier of
redistricting actors. Most prominently, federal law – as a result of precedents such as Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its progeny – permits litigants and federal courts to
engage in fallback redistricting through litigation and adjudication of federal redistricting
lawsuits.
61 Baker, 369 U.S. at 201.
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the Supreme Court has imposed a periodic redistricting mandate that prohibits
primary redistricting agents from avoiding the threat of fallback redistricting
simply by refusing to act.62 More specifically, the Supreme Court’s equal
representation jurisprudence effectively requires that district lines be redrawn
after each delivery of federal census data,63 and any failure by a primary
redistricting agent to comply with this affirmative mandate creates an
opportunity and need for fallback redistricting. Fallback redistricting has
become in this sense an integral, and routine, part of the process – and one that,
in its current form, depends heavily on both courts and litigants. Although the
latter’s role in the process tends to be conflated with that of the courts, these
sets of actors, and the effects they have on the process, are distinct.
a.

Courts as Fallback Redistricting Agents

The role of courts in redistricting is extensive. As one scholar puts it,
“[e]very 10 years, redistricting litigation joins death and taxes as one of life’s
certainties.”64 The landscape helps to explain why: in every jurisdiction across
the country, some combination of state and federal courts is potentially
empowered to alter district lines when, in response to the decennial census,
primary agents have failed to enact a legal map into law. The Supreme Court
has referred to this phenomenon as “judicial redistricting,”65 and it occurs with
regularity.66
A court alters district lines – that is, engages in fallback redistricting –
through one of two mechanisms. The first mechanism is analogous, in a loose
sense, to an appellate court’s remand, and it is the mechanism a court normally
is required to employ, at least initially, in the redistricting context.67 When
employing this mechanism, the court enjoins use of existing district lines,
identifies the legal restrictions it concludes require such action, and then
provides primary redistricting agents an opportunity to redraw the district lines
in a manner consistent with those same legal restrictions.68 Although the court

62 This quality differentiates fallback redistricting from more traditional forms of fallback
law. See supra note 56.
63 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 8 (1964); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1705 (1993). In a number of jurisdictions, state law independently
requires redistricting on a set timetable. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
64 Justin Levitt, Ten Lawyers Leaping: A New Year’s Redistricting Review, ALL ABOUT
REDISTRICTING (Jan. 3, 2012), http://redistricting.lls.edu/.
65 Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993).
66 See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Judging
Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643,
1688-90 (1993) (“[In 1980] roughly one-third of all redistricting was done either directly by
federal courts or under the injunctive authority of the courts.”).
67 See, e.g., Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978).
68 Id.
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in this circumstance is not directly drawing district lines, it is doing so
indirectly. The court has affected the shape of the district lines, and it has done
so in its capacity as a fallback redistricting agent.
The second mechanism is more direct than the first. Here, the court issues an
order in which it has drawn the district lines itself.69 It is in this circumstance
that court involvement in the redistricting process is truly unmistakable, as
certain districts – or even an entire map – are pure judicial creations. Though
this second mechanism is disfavored, to be employed only when the first
mechanism will not produce a legal district map in time for an election,70 its
use in redistricting is not unusual.71 A recent example came in Nevada in 2011,
where the state legislature had deadlocked and therefore failed to satisfy the
equal representation mandate. In response, a state court issued an order
completely redrawing congressional and legislative maps.72
A decree of this sort helps to illustrate the profound influence courts have
over the redistricting process. Courts nevertheless do face important limitations
on their ability to employ these redistricting mechanisms. Importantly, courts
are empowered to affect district lines only insofar as the primary redistricting
agents have failed to enact a legal map.73 To the extent that the legal deficiency
is based on federal law, there are “essentially seven substantive constraints on
the apportionment process,”74 which may be summarized as follows. The
Fourteenth Amendment requires that each plan (1) comply with the equal
representation principle;75(2) not purposefully discriminate against racial
minorities;76 (3) not “subordinate” what the Supreme Court has called “traditional race-neutral districting principles” to racial considerations unless that
subordination can survive strict scrutiny;77 and (4) in theory, at least, avoid

69

See, e.g., In re Petition of Reapportionment Comm’n, No. SC 18907, at *1 (Conn.
Sup. Ct. 2012), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/news/SC18907_021012.pdf
(ordering that a court-drawn plan of congressional districting “shall have the full force of
law”).
70 Wise, 437 U.S. at 540.
71 See Issacharoff, supra note 66, at 1688-90.
72 See Order Adopting and Approving Special Masters’ Report and Redistricting Maps as
Modified by the Court at 3-4, Guy v. Miller, No. 11-OC-00042-1B (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 27,
2011).
73 As discussed above, members of the fallback tier may contribute to such failures in
certain circumstances. See supra note 56.
74 Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50
STAN. L. REV. 731, 733 (1998).
75 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1964).
76 See, e.g., Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(three-judge court); see also, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); cf.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960).
77 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993).
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excessive political gerrymandering.78 Federal statutory law in turn requires that
a plan (5) not result in a dilution of minority voting strength (a “section 2”
claim);79 (6) in certain jurisdictions, not reduce minority voting strength as
compared to prior levels (a “section 5” claim);80 and (7) in congressional races,
not use multi-member districts.81 Depending on the jurisdiction, there also may
be restrictions set forth in state law.82 For a court to redraw map lines, it must
cite one of these restrictions as justification. This may not be difficult,
however, particularly when a jurisdiction violates the equal representation
principle by simply failing to redistrict.83
A second set of limitations relates to the criteria courts are permitted to
consider when redrawing a map. A court normally may not, for example,
redistrict for partisan ends,84 but rather must apply “neutral” criteria when
drafting plans.85 It must take into account the preferences and policies of the
primary redistricting agents whenever possible,86 and it normally must comply
78

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986); Karlan, supra note 74, at 733; see also
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). This is frequently referred to as a “Section 2” claim as it
derives from section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
80 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. This is frequently referred to as a “Section 5” claim as it
derives from section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
81 Karlan, supra note 74, at 733-34; see also 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2006).
82 In Florida, for example, voters recently enacted by initiative a number of strict
constraints on both state legislative and congressional redistricting, with one of the most
prominent of the new rules prohibiting the drawing of any district with “the intent to favor
or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.” FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20; see also id. § 21.
83 After each decennial census, jurisdictions are required to redistrict pursuant to the
equal representation principle recognized in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and its
progeny. These cases, which require that certain district populations be nearly equal in
population, have created a regime whereby even slight population shifts – which as a
practical matter are inevitable in the span of a decade – turn a jurisdiction’s failure to
redistrict once every ten years into an easily proven constitutional violation.
84 See, e.g., Maestas v. Hall, 274 P.3d 66, 76-77 (N.M. 2012) (“Despite our discomfort
with political considerations, we conclude that when New Mexico courts are required to
draw a redistricting map, they must do so with the appearance of and actual neutrality. The
courts should not select a plan that seeks partisan advantage.”); see also Wyche v. Madison
Parish Police Jury, 635 F.2d 1151, 1160 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[A] court is forbidden to take into
account the purely political considerations that might be appropriate for legislative
bodies.”).
85 See, e.g., Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 529, 540 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (“In addition to
the constitutional and statutory criteria, federal redistricting courts generally apply neutral
factors, including compactness, contiguity, and respect for historical local political
boundaries, in drafting congressional redistricting plans.”).
86 See, e.g., Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 941 (2012) (“[A] district court should take
guidance from the State’s recently enacted plan in drafting an interim plan. . . . This Court
has observed before that ‘faced with the necessity of drawing district lines by judicial order,
a court, as a general rule, should be guided by the legislative policies underlying’ a state
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with all the constitutional and statutory mandates that also constrain primary
redistricting agents.87 Despite these limitations, courts retain considerable
discretion in determining how to redraw map lines.
Perhaps most fundamentally, however, courts’ involvement in redistricting
is profoundly limited by the ubiquitous set of actors already mentioned. These
are the redistricting litigants, whose control over the process is as fundamental
as it has been overlooked.
b.

Litigants as Fallback Redistricting Agents

Courts may be the most conspicuous of fallback redistricting agents, but
they do not – indeed, they cannot – act alone. Rather, courts depend on
litigants. As a result, litigants exercise enormous influence over the
redistricting process, particularly once it has reached the fallback phase.
To some degree, litigants’ influence over the process is a predictable and
necessary consequence of the “litigant-driven model of American civil
adjudication.”88 Indeed, many of the ways litigants exercise their influence can
be inferred from the civil rules: at the very outset of a case, a redistricting
litigant makes a monumental decision – where to file suit – that very well may
affect the map that ultimately becomes law. Throughout the litigation, similar
actions work to affect the process and influence the outcome. The litigant
decides which claims to bring and which to ignore, which claims to defend and
which to concede, which intervention motions to challenge and which to
support, which evidence to proffer and which to disregard, which maps to
challenge and which to propose, and even something as deceptively simple as
which dates should be included in a proposed scheduling order. The examples
are hardly comprehensive, as redistricting litigants make decisions throughout
the life of a lawsuit in their efforts to affect district lines.
These decisions, and the legal mechanisms through which litigants
effectuate them, may appear unremarkable to those familiar with civil
litigation. Yet the influence that litigants have in a courtroom has particular
consequences in the context of redistricting. These qualities, which are
discussed in detail in Part II, confirm the privileged position that litigants play
in the redistricting process.
In short, redistricting litigants – that is, those who litigate for the purpose of
affecting the shape of electoral districts – serve as critical participants in the
fallback phase of redistricting. The fallback phase, in turn, serves as a critical
stage of each jurisdiction’s redistricting regime. Redistricting litigants in this
sense have become more than litigants. They have become powerful, legally
sanctioned agents of redistricting.
plan . . . ‘to the extent those policies do not lead to violations of the Constitution or the
Voting Rights Act.’” (quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 79 (1997)).
87 See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
88 Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 705, 722 n.66 (2004).
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C.

Where Redistricting Litigants Fit into the Current Conception of the
Redistricting Process

Given the importance of litigants in contemporary redistricting, one would
expect to find a robust body of literature examining redistricting litigants and
their participation. Yet one finds very little. With rare exception, the scholarly
accounts either ignore litigants or conflate them with the courts before which
they appear.89 Even courts, which must interact with these actors, rarely flag
the extent to which the judicial system relies on litigant participation, examine
the potential for procedural manipulation, or otherwise acknowledge the role
that litigants play. Rather, both scholars and courts tend to proceed as though
litigants are non-entities in the redistricting process, even as these actors
exercise such a pivotal role.90
It is nevertheless true that scholars have studied extensively the substantive
standards governing redistricting, particularly as those standards are, or should
be, applied by the courts. Indeed, “[a] major theme of election law scholarship
over the last decade has been that judicial oversight of the devices of
democracy is desirable to foster adequate political competition,”91 and even
89

With respect to the exceptions, Professor Karlan has provided one of the starkest
acknowledgements to date of litigants’ influence over the redistricting process. Identifying
certain “opportunities for procedural manipulation” that exist in redistricting litigation, she
concludes that “the Voting Rights Act is ripe for partisan capture.” Karlan, supra note 63, at
1733; see also id. at 1726-29 (discussing forum selection). Professor Cox has alluded to a
similar dynamic, citing “partisan adjudication and partisan capture of the litigation process”
as a concern in the context of proposing certain procedural reforms. Adam Cox, Partisan
Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 800 (2004). Other scholars,
such as Professor Buchman, have approached the issue from a political scientist’s
perspective, questioning the institutional capacity of redistricting courts by studying, among
other things, the implications of litigant control over courts’ “policy-making agenda.”
JEREMY BUCHMAN, DRAWING LINES IN QUICKSAND 91 (2003). A number of scholars have
analyzed the effect of litigant participation on a more general level or in other contexts. See,
e.g., Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L.
REV. 1457, 1490, 1497, 1514 (2003) (discussing the theory that “litigants, rather than
judges, drive judicial outcomes,” and ultimately concluding that “[w]hile it is very possible,
and even likely, that strategic litigant decisions may influence the outcome of some cases,
those cases appear to be isolated and infrequent”); David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing:
The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 808, 865-66 (2004) (discussing the effect of litigant injury on public law outcomes and
touching briefly on standing in the redistricting context); Peters, supra note 88 (addressing
litigant speech intended to influence court decisions). This Article seeks to draw upon and
advance these scholarly accounts.
90 It is true that scholarship directed at other forms of litigation, including so-called
“public law litigation,” at times pays closer attention to the role that litigants play. Yet the
existing literature in these fields fails to analyze the specific nature and implications of
redistricting-related challenges, and as such it does not adequately capture the particular
phenomenon that is redistricting litigation.
91 Richard L. Hasen, Judges as Political Regulators: Evidence and Options for
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today many scholars “continue to urge the courts to intervene more deeply” as
they advance new refinements of the relevant standards.92 These works, while
tremendously valuable, nevertheless tend to forgo sustained analysis into the
procedural and practical implications of the court proceedings they envision.
An increasingly robust body of literature has delved deeper, examining not
only the substance but also the procedures of redistricting litigation.93
Meanwhile, a “new generation of legal scholars” has been challenging a
premise that underlies many of these works – that is, that the courts have the
ability “to act as [a] neutral redistricting referee”94 – as part of the movement
termed the “New Institutionalism.”95 Throughout these debates, scholars have
questioned whether, and to what extent, courts should take precedence over
alternative institutions (or vice versa) in designing and supervising elections.96
These discussions – at once tackling issues of democratic design,
legitimacy, and institutional competence, all in the highly charged and
consequential context of redistricting – have helped to illuminate the
significance of who redistricts and are otherwise of great value. They
nevertheless remain incomplete, for they tend to ignore the critical role that
litigants play throughout the process. This means, for example, that they
analyze courts’ decisions to “enter the judicial thicket” without recognizing
that litigants, and not courts, are the ones initially making such decisions.97
Institutional Change, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 101,
101 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011); see also,
e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 594; Persily, supra note 5, at 650.
92 Cain, supra note 2, at 1811.
93
See, e.g., BUCHMAN, supra note 89, at 1; Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging
the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) [hereinafter Cox & Miles, Judging
the VRA]; Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1493-94, 1527-35 (2008) [hereinafter
Cox & Miles, Judicial Ideology] (setting forth empirical data relating to the significance of
who redistricts, in the context of judicial redistricting); Karlan, supra note 74, at 733;
Karlan, supra note 63, at 1705; Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A
Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting Plans, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1131, 1146-47 (2005)
(providing a practical guide for courts charged with redistricting); Michael E. Solimine,
Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the Supreme
Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767 (2007) (discussing unusual procedures implicated by election
law cases).
94 Cain, supra note 2, at 1811.
95 See Richard L. Hasen, Election Administration Reform and the New Institutionalism,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2010) (“Faced with little action by the courts and Congress,
some election law scholars, whom I dub ‘New Institutionalists,’ have turned to institutional
design.”).
96 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
97 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 595 (“While the Court’s willingness to enter the
‘political thicket’ was of tremendous jurisprudential significance, the underlying insight was
hardly a great conceptual breakthrough.”); see also id. (describing courts’ “oversight of the
political arena” without mentioning litigants).

584

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:563

They subject redistricting precedents to critical analysis without reflecting on
how each decision is inexorably intertwined with litigants’ actions, arguments,
and strategic choices – and, moreover, how each of these precedents is
dependent on litigants for its continued enforcement.98 They propose reforms –
often, ironically, in an effort to divorce redistricting from self-interested
manipulation or partisan control – that can be implemented only through the
courts, and therefore only through the initiative of litigants who themselves are
self-interested and often have partisan ties.99 In short, they pay insufficient
attention to redistricting litigants, who, as a result, have managed to secure a
position in the current conception of the redistricting process that drastically
underestimates their influence and spares them critical scrutiny.
D.

Why Understanding the Role of Litigants Matters

The preceding discussion has identified the central observation motivating
this Article’s analysis: litigants are important and distinct agents of
redistricting, upon whom the process relies, who are capable of affecting
redistricting in deliberate and potentially outcome-determinative ways. What
the discussion has yet to address, at least directly, is why these observations
matter. The remainder of this Article aims to provide an answer to precisely
this question. Before delving into such detail, however, it is helpful to provide
an overview of what is at stake.
Stated succinctly, understanding the role that litigants play in redistricting is
significant for everyone involved. It certainly is important for scholars, as
litigants’ role in the process is an essential part of understanding how
redistricting operates in the United States. And the importance of recognizing
litigants’ role in the process extends beyond the descriptive; it is equally vital
for the normative and prescriptive reasons identified below.
Indeed, understanding the role of litigants is essential to those committed to
reform. Perhaps most critically, this is because nearly all redistricting-related
reforms implicitly rely on litigants for implementation or enforcement. This is
almost certainly true when the suggested reform is meant to be administered
through the courts. Yet nearly all types of reforms rely on litigants at least as
backstops; if the primary redistricting agents fail to comply with the relevant
rule, recourse normally is obtainable through litigation. Litigant influence in
this sense will affect the nature and effectiveness of a proposed reform, and it
may even undermine its purpose. If the goal of a reform is “to ensure the
competitive vitality of the political process,”100 for example, it is, at best,
problematic to advocate for a court-driven reform that necessarily relies on
litigants – who, as discussed above, tend to be associated with particular
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See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 1384-85.
See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 595; Persily, supra note 5, at 650.
100 Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 597.
99

2013]

DELEGATION OF DEMOCRATIC DESIGN

585

political parties or interest groups and may lack incentives to increase electoral
competition – for implementation.101
Understanding the role that litigants play also is critical for judges, who
serve as central agents of fallback redistricting. These are the individuals
empowered to administer the redistricting regimes that rely so heavily on
litigant participation. An awareness of the ways in which litigants affect the
process is a prerequisite to courts being able to respond (or compensate) as
appropriate.
Finally, understanding the role of litigants is vital to everyone – including
every voter and constituent – with a personal stake in the redistricting process.
This is not only because litigant participation can affect redistricting outcomes;
it is also because litigant participation raises difficult questions of
legitimacy.102
In short, the participation of litigants in the redistricting process is important
for all involved parties. And it will be for some time, for under no realistic
scenario will litigant participation become less critical to the redistricting
process in the foreseeable future. Reforms currently under consideration will
not change the fundamental dynamic; as noted above, most reforms actually
rely on litigants for implementation or enforcement, and, tellingly, even
reforms designed to decrease the opportunities for litigation may not have
“lessened the odds of redistricting-related litigation or the sore-loser incentive
to try to get a better plan out of the courts.”103 Nor are the courts poised to
fundamentally alter the status quo. It is true that the courts’ resolution of
certain cases and legal controversies may affect the types of substantive claims
that redistricting litigants bring. Yet none of these doctrinal developments has
even the potential to undermine the central role that litigants play in the
process, particularly in light of the litigation sure to follow any new
constitutional holdings and the very real possibility of state law restrictions on
the redistricting process.104 With the stakes in mind, it is time to turn to the
implications: to the curious regime that has resulted from this delegation of
redistricting authority.
II.

THE POWER DELEGATED TO THESE LITIGANTS AND THE CURIOUS REGIME
THAT RESULTS

In the United States, the task of developing enforceable electoral lines has
been delegated, in significant part, to the ad hoc, heterogeneous, and largely
self-selected group of actors known as redistricting litigants. This Part presents
the case for why the delegation matters. Forced through the mold of civil
101

For discussion of reforms that take into account litigant influence, see infra Part III.B.
See infra text accompanying note 230.
103 Cain, supra note 2, at 1812 (discussing independent citizen commissions).
104 See generally Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular
Initiatives to Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 333
(2007); supra note 82.
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litigation, this delegation has created a form of redistricting that is highly
susceptible to litigant manipulation. It has, in other words, created a form of
redistricting that grants profound – albeit thus far largely unacknowledged –
power to those who choose to litigate.
A.

A Curious Form of Litigation

There is much about the practice of litigating as redistricting that is
remarkable. The power delegated to redistricting litigants has direct effects on
democratic design. These effects are jurisdiction-wide, as redistricting courts
are empowered to fashion unusually broad and intrusive remedies even as they
are expected to rely on a handful of litigants to represent the interests of an
entire electorate. The redistricting process from start to finish is profoundly
politicized, what scholars have called “politics pure, fraught with the capacity
for self-dealing and cynical manipulation,”105 and it is one that leads to fierce
battles between political parties as well as acute concerns over federalism and
separation of powers.106 The act of redistricting through the courts is all this
and more – yet it is exercised not through a specialized set of procedures, but
rather through the traditional mechanisms of civil litigation.
This combination has led to a litigant-empowering process of redistricting
that is manifested most prominently through three defining features: (1) the
flexible and forgiving regime it offers to those electing to litigate; (2) its failure
to protect the interests of non-parties; and (3) a shifting regime of legal
standards that has developed in response to the exigencies of the election cycle.
Individually, each of these features has significant effects on the way
redistricting litigation unfolds. Combined, they produce a redistricting regime
that is ripe for litigant control.
1.

The Warm Embrace of Litigants

Redistricting is nothing if not hospitable to litigants. It invites them in; it
offers them power; it forgives their bad manners. In part, the arrangement is an
unavoidable consequence of jurisdictions’ heavy dependence on litigants as
agents of fallback redistricting. By delegating so much, redistricting regimes in
the United States ensure that litigants will enjoy a prominent seat at the table.
Yet it is the way these litigants are treated – the favorable treatment they
receive, even within the litigant-centered world of civil litigation – that
characterizes redistricting litigation as particularly accommodating of litigants.
Several doctrines provide powerful illustrations of this dynamic. The
doctrines of standing and forum selection, for example, operate and interact in
ways that privilege redistricting litigants, giving them significant flexibility
and power as they work toward the redistricting outcomes they desire.
Likewise, the power associated with claim selection, a formidable source of
105
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Among other things, “court-drawn plans can present one of the most intense
interbranch conflicts that our constitutional system allows.” Persily, supra note 93, at 1146.
106

2013]

DELEGATION OF DEMOCRATIC DESIGN

587

influence available to nearly any litigant, is in certain respects magnified in the
redistricting context. Each of these doctrines is addressed in turn.
a.

Standing

In the redistricting context, standing doctrine is a legal maladroit, frequently
criticized and seemingly unable to do anything well. It makes little sense as a
conceptual matter.107 It often is unclear in application.108 And, perhaps most
important, it fails to impose practical constraints on any reasonably
sophisticated party wishing to litigate a redistricting case. It is this last
characteristic that most favors litigants.
It is true that to establish standing in federal court, a redistricting litigant
normally, though not always, must reside as a voter in the jurisdiction he or she
is seeking to challenge.109 As a doctrinal matter, the theory behind this rule
appears to be that if a voter is placed in an unlawfully drawn district, that voter
personally suffers harms associated with that unlawfulness.110 While this
residence-related limitation might be significant in the abstract, it has almost
no effect in practice. This is because, for any given claim, a vast number of
individuals fit the bill. Millions of voters might have standing to bring a
routine equal-representation challenge in response to a state’s failure to
redistrict; a smaller number of voters – but one still in the tens or hundreds of
thousands – might have standing to bring a district-specific challenge in most
other jurisdictions. What is more, even those without standing are not, as a
practical matter, precluded from advancing a claim: if a party wishes to
participate in redistricting litigation, that party can do so simply by locating a
geographically eligible voter willing to serve as a stand-in. This task is made
relatively straightforward – at least, for any moderately sophisticated party –
by the enormous number of individuals with standing to assert a given claim.
An interest group headquartered in Washington, D.C., for example, easily can
participate in a legal challenge to electoral districts in Alabama, Utah, or
California; it simply must find a group member, or any other individual
sympathetic to the group’s cause, who lives in the relevant district and is
willing to serve as the nominal litigant. There is little risk or downside for the
litigant volunteer, who has no practical risk of counterclaims and presumably
is indemnified for all possible costs. This is not a hypothetical arrangement
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See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in
Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276 (1998).
108 See, e.g., Saul Zipkin, Democratic Standing, 26 J.L. & POL. 179, 180-85 (2011).
109
See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995). See generally Zipkin,
supra note 108, at 180. Exceptions to this residence requirement include circumstances
where the plaintiffs “can show ‘specific evidence’ that they ‘personally’ were subject to a
racial classification,” see id. at 193 (quoting Hays, 515 U.S. at 745), or when the plaintiff
brings certain types of vote-dilution claims, see Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the
Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1690 (2001).
110 See, e.g., Hays, 515 U.S. at 744-45.
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dreamed up by theorists; the practice, though difficult to monitor, appears to be
routine.111
What this means, as a practical matter, is that the courthouse doors are open
to anyone wishing to participate in redistricting litigation, so long as that party
is able and willing to incur the costs of litigation and, where necessary, to
coordinate with a geographically convenient third party. While analogs may
exist in other contexts,112 such a regime remains procedurally unusual. The
legal barriers imposed by the standing doctrines normally do have real
practical effects, even in the more flexible realm of impact litigation: they
make it difficult, for example, for an environmental organization to challenge a
regulation affecting endangered species across the world,113 and they make it
virtually impossible for a taxpayer to challenge certain executive actions taken
in alleged violation of the First Amendment.114 In more routine matters, they
impose significant barriers for any litigant hoping to pursue sweeping forms of
relief. What they fail to do is limit, in any meaningful sense, who participates
in redistricting litigation. And it is in this sense that redistricting litigation
proves, right at the outset of a case, quite hospitable to litigants.
b.

Forum Selection

The advantages of the flexible standing regime extend beyond the opening
of courthouse doors. The standing doctrines, coupled with traditional venue
rules, also create a particularly plaintiff-friendly system for determining who
will serve as the judicial mediator in this system of fallback redistricting. These
doctrines combine, in other words, to empower redistricting plaintiffs wishing
to select a judge through forum selection.
For purposes of this discussion, forum selection refers to decisions made by
litigants concerning where to litigate when more than one forum is legally
available. For redistricting litigants, the selection normally is confined to a
particular state: plaintiffs challenging New York’s electoral districts, for
example, must file their lawsuits in federal or state court in New York. In
determining the significance of this practice, it may be helpful to think of
litigants attempting to secure not a given forum, but rather a given judge. This
is because, in the redistricting context, the most important consequence of the
exercise is its effect on the likelihood that certain judges will adjudicate the
case – in other words, that certain judges will serve as the fallback-tier
111

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Respondent at 28, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880
(2008) (No. 07-371) (arguing that in public right cases “the number of plaintiffs with
standing is potentially limitless” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
113 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-67 (1992) (holding that
environmental-litigation plaintiffs failed to satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement).
114 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 600 (2007) (discussing
the difficulties taxpayers face in establishing standing to bring Establishment Clause
claims).
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redistricting agents empowered to mediate between the litigants and the maps
they seek to affect.
Of course, for selection among forums potentially to make a difference, it
must be true that courts are neither fungible nor perceived to be fungible. At
least when stated at a high level of generality, these empirical assertions appear
to be sound. Few would defend the proposition that courts, or judges, are
perfectly interchangeable, and such an understanding is confirmed in the
redistricting context through empirical studies as well as by the perception of
courts held by lawyers, commentators, and the general public.115 While natural
experiments are hard to come by – as it is rare for multiple courts to be
litigating substantially identical lawsuits – the occasional unfolding of parallel
lawsuits has confirmed that different courts may indeed reach different
redistricting outcomes.116 Selecting forum, in other words, does appear to
affect the ultimate outcome in redistricting suits – which means that it affects
electoral lines.
So, then, to what extent are redistricting litigants able to select their forums?
The short answer is that while certain limitations do exist, redistricting litigants
(or, more specifically, plaintiffs) are otherwise able to exercise close to
unfettered control over which judges will adjudicate their claims.
Texas serves as a particularly helpful model. Its last two decades of
redistricting illustrate vividly the ease with which redistricting litigants can
115

See, e.g., Cain, supra note 2, at 1836; Cox & Miles, Judicial Ideology, supra note 93,
at 1493-94 (identifying scholarship supporting the conclusions that “Democratic appointees
were more likely than Republican appointees to vote for liability” under a key provision of
the Voting Rights Act and that “a judge’s race had an even greater effect than partisanship
on the likelihood of favoring liability”); Persily, supra note 93, at 1146 (“Courts vary
considerably in how and when they draw their maps, whom they get to help them, who will
have input into the process and when, and whether they will make changes to a plan once it
is released. . . . The choice of different procedures can have a dramatic impact on the final
plan that emerges.”). A recent illustration of how judges can be popularly portrayed in the
context of redistricting emerges from Pennsylvania. In the lead-up to the 2009 elections,
“the political parties emphasized the critical need to win the [open seat on the state supreme
court] because of the upcoming legislative redistricting process that [would] likely end up
before the Supreme Court.” Shira J. Goodman et al., What’s More Important: Electing
Judges or Judicial Independence? It’s Time for Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial
Independence, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 859, 868-69 (2010); see also, e.g., id. at 868 n.27 (“Lt. Gov.
Joe Scarnati’s letter to fellow Republicans . . . was unusually blunt. ‘Control of the Supreme
Court is on the ballot this year . . . and you know the courts play a key role in finalizing
redistricting maps that will set the political landscape for the next decade.’”). After the
election, one newspaper described the results as follows: “Orie Melvin Wins . . . . The GOP
will control state’s Supreme Court after bitter race.” Id. at 868 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Debra Todd, Lady Justice Is Nonpartisan, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Nov. 23, 2009, at B7)).
116 See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 27-28, 37-38 (1993) (describing different
results reached by state and federal courts adjudicating redistricting challenges that, in
relevant part, were identical).
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select a preferred forum. In 2001, legislative deadlock left in place an old
district map, which failed to apportion Texas’s population equally among
districts as required by law.117 As a result, litigants challenged the map based
on the equal representation doctrine in at least seven separate forums,
including four separate state courts.118 According to the Texas Supreme Court,
each of these four state courts was a viable forum for litigating the underlying
redistricting claims.119 Though the court pointedly bemoaned the lack of
“adequate procedures for judicial administration to prevent undesirable forumshopping” that already had become endemic in redistricting litigation,120 it
nevertheless felt compelled to reward the practice. The court concluded that
venue would be dictated by whichever forum-selecting party had timed its
filing properly and, in that sense, had won the race to the courthouse.121
The pointed comments by the Texas Supreme Court did little to bring
reform in Texas, and the result was predictable. In 2011 the state saw litigants
file similar redistricting challenges in eight different forums – for a combined
fourteen competing lawsuits – all before the legislature even had enacted the
congressional map being challenged.122 The situation was again criticized from
the bench, as a federal district judge bemoaned the “forum shopping” reflected
by the “filing of patently ridiculous actions months before there is a
redistricting plan [to] which to object.”123
At both the state and federal level, Texas’s forum-selection regime produces
startling results, but it is no anomaly. To the contrary, it exemplifies the way
forum is determined in many jurisdictions.124 As such, the regime confirms that
117

Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 242-43 (Tex. 2001).
See id. at 242-43, 243 n.10.
119 Id. at 252-56.
120 Id. at 243-44.
121 Id. at 253.
122 See Rodriguez v. Perry, No. A–11–CA–451, 2011 WL 3209075, at *1 (W.D. Tex.
July 27, 2011) (Yeakel, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at *3.
124 See, e.g., OHIO R. CIV. P. 3(B)(1), (6); IND. R. TRIAL P. 75(A); see also, e.g., R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 9-4-3 (permitting suit to be brought in any jurisdiction “in which some one of
the plaintiffs or defendants shall dwell”); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 4221 (McKinney)
(providing that, upon the petition of any citizen, “[a]n apportionment by the legislature shall
be subject to review” by the state trial courts but failing to impose any limitation as to which
trial court may conduct this review other than that it be “where any . . . petitioner resides”).
An exception comes in Minnesota, which has responded to its own generally applicable
venue regime with a judicially developed practice of appointing a multi-judge panel to hear
redistricting cases. After a lawsuit is filed in Minnesota state court but before there has been
any determination on the merits, a party petitions the Chief Justice, who then appoints the
multi-judge panel. This practice effectively negates any effect of forum selection within the
state. See, e.g., Hippert v. Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. Spec. Redistricting Panel 2012)
(drawing lines following the 2010 Census); Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, No. C0-01-160 (Minn.
Spec. Redistricting Panel Mar. 19, 2002) (same, for the 2000 Census).
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redistricting litigants often can, in effect, disregard the limits imposed by the
venue statutes and simply select the forum most likely to secure a preferred
judge. While this may not be a unique ability – insofar as litigants in certain
other litigation contexts may encounter similarly little difficulty in
circumventing venue-related restrictions125 – the analogs do not detract from
the fact that forum-selection regimes permit litigants to dictate a fundamental
feature of fallback redistricting and, moreover, that this degree of control
remains outside the norm for most civil litigants.
At a fundamental level, this regime reflects a direct but unintended
consequence of relying on a trans-substantive approach to civil procedure.
More specifically, the regime is a result of the application of general venue
rules to the unusual sorts of claims that drive redistricting lawsuits. A
discussion of the relevant legal doctrines helps to explain how this works.
There are three scenarios in which redistricting litigants face the possibility of
selecting a forum: (1) when selecting a forum within the federal system, (2)
when selecting a forum within the state system, and (3) when selecting
between the federal and state systems. It is in the first two scenarios that
redistricting litigants exercise the most significant control. The federal regime
illustrates why.
In federal court the generally applicable venue statute applies to redistricting
lawsuits. Venue therefore is appropriate in “a judicial district where any
defendant resides” or “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”126 With respect to the
prototypical redistricting claim – a statewide equal representation claim –
litigants and most courts have interpreted this venue statute to permit, at a
minimum, filings in the judicial district where the state government sits (that
is, “where [the] defendant resides”), as well as filings in any judicial district
where an electoral district is overpopulated as compared to the state average.127
A creative set of litigants might expand the options even further by arguing
that because statewide redistricting necessarily affects lines across the entire
state, a “substantial part” of the events giving rise to an equal representation
claim occurs in every district in the state, and so venue would be proper in any
district.128 Even if a court were to reject this more aggressive application of the
125 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy
Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141 (2006).
126 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2006).
127 See, e.g., Clark v. Marx, No. 11-2149, 2012 WL 41926, at *6 (W.D. La. Jan. 9, 2012);
Molinari v. Bloomberg, No. CV-08-4539, 2008 WL 5412433, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22,
2008). The latter set of venues – that is, any judicial district where an electoral district is
overpopulated as compared to the state average – is available under the theory that a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the redistricting claim occurred in
that same district. Id. at *5.
128 As one court put it, “the effects of the redistricting legislation challenged in this case
will be ‘profoundly felt’ in practically every voting district throughout the State of Texas.”
Thomas v. Bush, No. H-95-0237, slip op. at 7-8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 1995) (rejecting this
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venue statute, a motivated litigant should be able to secure venue in a given
district through other means – including by adding a separate claim more
closely associated with a particular electoral district contained in that judicial
district.129 In short, the application of the federal venue statute tends to permit
filing of federal redistricting claims anywhere in the state. Federal redistricting
litigants in this sense exercise a formidable power over who will adjudicate
their case – and therefore who will serve as the agent meant to mediate their
participation in the process.
An analogous pattern also holds in many state-court systems. This is
because many American jurisdictions likewise depend on generally applicable
venue statutes for some or all redistricting challenges.130 It is in these
jurisdictions that litigants tend to enjoy wide latitude in selecting a forum. This
is true in Texas, for example, where state redistricting litigants proceed under a
general venue statute that is analogous to the federal statute.131 As in federal
court, therefore, a litigant in Texas state court has a good chance of being able
to file suit anywhere in the state, and thereby increase his or her odds of
securing a preferred judge.
Two sets of caveats should be acknowledged. At the outset, it is true that
redistricting litigants select a forum; they do not select a judge. As a result,
litigants will not always be able to secure a preferred judge simply by
strategically selecting a forum. This distinction, while important, should not be
overstated. Forum selection and judge selection are closely related. By
securing a forum, a plaintiff normally ensures that the case will be heard by
one of a certain set of judges.132

theory of venue on the ground that it would make the venue statute “lose all meaning”).
129 The venue argument, in that case, would not be based on overpopulation, but rather
that “a substantial part of the events or omissions” giving rise to the district-specific claim
occurred in the district in question. Adding district-specific claims is also how a plaintiff
might attempt to secure a preferred forum in the absence of a statewide equal-representation
claim.
130 A non-exhaustive list of jurisdictions without any redistricting-specific venue statutes
includes Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. A number of
other jurisdictions have redistricting-specific venue rules that apply only to certain types of
challenges or district maps. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2, ¶ 7; OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 13.
131 This statute provides for venue in Texas state courts “in the county in which all or a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” or in the county
where the defendant either resides or has its principal office. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 15.002 (West 2002).
132 If a plaintiff were to file suit in New York’s New York County, for example, he or
she is ensuring that the case will be heard by one of eight particular trial court judges (and,
consequently, not by any of the trial court judges from the other sixty-one judicial counties
across the state). Depending on local rules and orders, a litigant may be able to narrow such
a group down even further. For example, if a case were filed in the Austin Division of the
Western District of Texas while a certain jurisdiction-wide order had been in effect, litigants
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It likewise is true that in both the state and the federal systems there are
several important limitations on the ability of redistricting plaintiffs to dictate
venue. Three warrant particular mention. First, litigants tend to enjoy relatively
little control with respect to whether a given redistricting claim ultimately will
be adjudicated in the state or federal court system. This limitation derives from
a confused combination of judicially created doctrines and federal statutes.133
The jumble of rules does not, however, prevent a truly motivated plaintiff –
that is, one willing to sacrifice otherwise available claims simply to secure
forum – from ensuring the case will proceed in either the state or federal
system. It likewise does not impede litigants’ ability to select a forum within
either of the two parallel systems.
The second major limitation applies only to federal courts, as it derives from
a federal statute requiring that many, though not all, redistricting cases be
heard by a three-judge panel.134 The first member of this three-judge panel is
the judge to which the case originally is assigned.135 Litigants triggering the
three-judge-panel statute are therefore able – through forum selection – to
affect who will serve as the first panel judge. The second two judges, by
contrast, are selected by the chief judge of the circuit in which the case is being
brought, and litigants have no formal mechanism to influence the chief judge’s
decisions. As such, the effect of forum selection in the federal courts is muted
by the panel statute. Still, the effect is by no means eradicated. Among other
things, certain aspects of a judge’s identity, including his or her partisan
affiliation, are likely to affect how the other judges on the panel adjudicate the
case.136
The final major limitation applies only to certain state jurisdictions. This
limitation stems from narrowly applicable laws that dictate forum specifically

would be assured that the case would be assigned to one of three judges based on certain
percentage calculations. See Amended Order Assigning the Business of the Court, Western
District of Texas (filed Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/rules/stdor
d/district/botc.pdf.
133 Most prominently, various authorities prevent federal courts from adjudicating certain
state redistricting claims. For example, the “Growe doctrine” requires that federal courts in
particular circumstances defer adjudication of federal redistricting claims to state courts. See
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993). In addition, a defendant normally can remove
a case, including one involving redistricting-related claims, from state to federal court, so
long as it originally could have been filed in federal district court. See, e.g., Yatauro v.
Mangano, No. 11-CV-3079, 2011 WL 2610562, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2011); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).
134 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (“A district court of three judges shall be convened . . . when an
action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional
districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.”).
135 Id. § 2284(b)(1).
136 See Cox & Miles, Judging the VRA, supra note 93, at 25-29, 34-37 (providing
evidence that “panel effects” have strong influence in redistricting litigation).
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for redistricting-related lawsuits.137 Where such a law applies, it has a profound
effect – and one that warrants special attention for those interested in reform.
While each of the state jurisdictions has its own venue regime, they can be
separated into two broad categories: states that have laws specifically dictating
forum for redistricting lawsuits, and states that do not. The range of state-court
choices available to a redistricting litigant tends to depend, more than anything,
on this particular distinction. While, as noted above, many jurisdictions depend
on generally applicable venue statutes for redistricting challenges, a
surprisingly high percentage do have redistricting-specific venue rules.138 Of
these jurisdictions, many require redistricting challenges to go directly to the
state supreme court.139 In a smaller number of states, redistricting-related
claims are funneled to a particular trial court.140 These constitutional and
statutory provisions do not completely eliminate forum selection, given, among
other things, the possibility that a particular challenge will proceed in the
federal system.141 Nevertheless, each regime significantly reduces the forumselection opportunities litigants otherwise might have.
Combined, these three major limitations on forum selection – limitations
that funnel cases into either the state or federal court system; that require a
three-judge panel in various federal lawsuits; and that, in certain states, force
litigants to comply with redistricting-specific venue rules – do constrain
litigants in certain respects. Yet they apply only in certain jurisdictions and
only under certain, limited circumstances.
Otherwise, the normal constraints on litigants’ ability to select venue –
constraints that reduce the potency of forum selection in many other forms of
litigation – prove ineffectual in the redistricting context. One constraint relates
137

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 29-1-2.5(a) (“Any legal action which contests the validity of
any redistricting or reapportionment plan, or any portion of any such plan, for the state
Senate, state House of Representatives, United States Congress, State Board of Education,
or any other statewide redistricting or reapportionment plan, or portion of any other
statewide plan, enacted by the Legislature, shall be commenced in the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County.”).
138 More than twenty states, including those identified below, have some redistrictingspecific venue rule on the books. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. Often,
these rules apply only to certain types of challenges or maps. See, e.g., Brown v.
Butterworth, 831 So. 2d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that a certain provision
of the Florida Constitution – one that requires that review of certain district maps be
conducted by the Florida Supreme Court – “is limited to claims of facial invalidity involving
the one-person, one-vote principle as well as the specific districting requirements of the state
constitution” but that “[a]ll as-applied constitutional and VRA challenges . . . must be
brought in a court of competent jurisdiction,” which includes the state’s circuit courts); see
also FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16.
139 See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 3; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §
1909 (2002).
140 See ALA. CODE § 29-1-2.5 (LexisNexis 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1 (2011).
141 See supra notes 126-29, 133 and accompanying text.
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to flexibility (or, at least, a particular type of flexibility142) in claim selection.
In standard litigation, it often is not possible for a litigant, seeking simply to
secure venue, to identify a non-frivolous claim closely associated with a
particular judicial district. Yet for redistricting litigants this rarely poses a
challenge. In part, this is due to the ease with which redistricting litigants can
circumvent the standing rules,143 and in part it is a consequence of the number
of electoral districts normally contained in a single judicial district. Texas, for
example, has only 4 federal judicial districts, which collectively contain 36
congressional electoral districts, 150 state house districts, and 31 state senate
districts.144 Numbers of this sort make it even easier to identify a claim
associated with a particular judicial district. As a result, redistricting litigants
find themselves unable to include a venue-securing claim only in the rarest of
cases.
A second constraint relates to appellate review. At least in theory, appellate
review should mute the effects of forum selection. This is because the practice
helps to ensure uniformity among lower-court outcomes, so that a litigant’s
ability to secure a preferred forum – and, by extension, a preferred judge –
should not affect the ultimate result. While the unifying effect of appellate
review is easily overstated,145 that effect is, in at least one important respect,
particularly weak in the redistricting context. This is because appellate courts
give significant deference to trial court findings of fact,146 and redistricting
litigation is exceptionally fact intensive, involving “unusually complex factual
patterns.”147 It is in this respect that a trial court’s redistricting rulings are more
likely to survive appellate review.
In short, redistricting plaintiffs, with the aim of affecting the shape of
district lines, enjoy a venue regime that is quite accommodating of their
142

It is true that redistricting litigants do face significant substantive constraints with
respect to which claims they may bring. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. Yet they
encounter few procedural constraints, and this latter flexibility is what facilitates forum
selection.
143 See supra Part II.A.1.a.
144 28 U.S.C. § 133 (2006); Texas State Senate Districts, TEX. REDISTRICTING, http://gis1.
tlc.state.tx.us/?PlanHeader=PLANs172 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013); Texas Congressional
Districts, TEX. REDISTRICTING, http://gis1.tlc.state.tx.us/?PlanHeader=PLANc235 (last
visited Jan. 15, 2013); Texas State House Districts, TEX. REDISTRICTING, http://gis1.tlc.state.
tx.us/?PlanHeader=PLANh309 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
145 The unifying effect of appellate review is muted by a number of factors, including
overcrowded dockets, failures by litigants to adequately present an appeal (or even to bring
an appeal), and appellate deference to trial court findings of fact.
146 Normally, findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. In some courts, the deference
is even greater; in Texas, for example, the state supreme court lacks jurisdiction to review
“questions of fact” in cases on review from the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Universe Life
Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 73 (Tex. 1997) (Hecht, J., concurring in the judgment).
147 Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th
Cir. 1989) (quoting Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1984)).
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preferences and therefore that facilitates their efforts to secure a preferred
judge. It is a profound power to wield over the redistricting process.
c.

Claim Selection

Where forum selection might be characterized as transfers of authority
among potential redistricting agents, claim selection might be characterized as
the setting of the courts’ agendas.148 Through this second powerful mechanism,
litigants are again able to exercise significant control over the redistricting
process.
The source of this empowerment is, in a sense, straightforward: like all
courts, redistricting courts normally can act only in response to a lawsuit.149 So
despite the tendency of scholars to refer to redistricting adjudications as courtdriven phenomena – as forms of “judicial oversight,” as “intervention” by the
courts, or the like – it actually is the litigants, and not the courts, making initial
decisions concerning whether to intervene. And even when a litigant does
challenge a district map, that decision does not permit a court to consider every
possible legal challenge.150 Rather, the litigants are the ones who identify the
specific challenges to bring and the specific districts to challenge. As a result,
even if district lines are unlawful, they will control elections unless and until
some litigant decides to bring an on-point challenge.151
It is true that redistricting litigants face substantive constraints with respect
to what challenges they can bring, as the universe of recognized redistrictingrelated claims is far from extensive.152 But within the universe of recognized
causes of action, numerous precedents illustrate both the ability of redistricting
148 For political theorists, the term “agenda setting,” applied in the election context,
generally refers to an “attempt by those who structure the rules concerning presentation of
questions to voters to create pathways that favor one or another outcome.” Issacharoff,
supra note 5, at 595 (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
(2d ed. 1963)). Redistricting litigants use claim selection to achieve analogous ends. This
analogy therefore casts the redistricting litigant in an appropriate but perhaps surprising role:
as one who structures the rules.
149 See, e.g., Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d 711, 735 (Pa.
2012) (“The Constitution neither authorizes nor requires this Court to engage in its own de
novo review of redistricting plans in order to assure that all constitutional commands have
been satisfied.”).
150 Id.
151 There are limited exceptions to this regime. See infra notes 252-53 and accompanying
text (discussing Florida’s litigation-forcing provisions and section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act). And it is true that the mere existence of legal mandates, particularly when coupled
with the threat of litigation, has some deterrent effect.
152 See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (refusing to permit a political
gerrymandering challenge to go forward); Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 630-31 (“One of the
perverse consequences of the absence of any real constitutional vigilance over partisan
gerrymandering is that litigants must squeeze all claims of improper manipulation of
redistricting into the suffocating category of race.”).
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litigants to use claim selection to set courts’ agendas and the significance this
power has in the context of redistricting. The Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Perry v. Perez provides a particularly helpful example.153 In Perry, the
district court had drawn and attempted to implement interim maps for an
upcoming election.154 On expedited review, the Supreme Court reversed.155
Explaining that the district court had failed to take into sufficient account the
maps drawn by the state legislature, the Supreme Court noted that the district
court on remand would be required “of course, . . . not to incorporate into the
interim plan any legal defects in the state plan.”156 The Supreme Court then
quickly confirmed that the possible range of “legal defects” is defined not by
the court’s independent review, but rather by the “challenges” brought by
litigants.157 It even clarified that the rule applies with respect to claims where
the defendant bears the burden of establishing a map’s legality.158 The Court,
in other words, confirmed that a court normally should avoid considering any
legal challenge beyond those raised by the parties – even when the legality of
electoral lines is at stake.
Another striking example of agenda setting comes in the context of politicalgerrymandering claims. Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Vieth v.
Jubelirer is notable for its insistence on limiting the scope of its holding not
only to the specific claims advanced by the litigants and their amici, but also to
their specific legal theories.159 Justice Kennedy emphasized, in rejecting the
plaintiffs’ claims, that the Court “should adjudicate only what is in the papers
before [it],”160 and his opinion expressly left open the possibility that “in
another case a standard might emerge.”161 Justice Kennedy’s approach has
provoked criticism: as Justice Scalia asserted in the plurality opinion, “it is our
job, not the plaintiffs’, to explicate the standard that makes the facts alleged by
the plaintiffs adequate or inadequate to state a claim.”162 Yet even the criticism
confirms the central role played by litigants: under Justice Scalia’s conception,
it still remains the redistricting plaintiffs’ job to decide which claims to bring
and which facts to allege.
Perry and Vieth illustrate ways in which redistricting litigants limit the
scope of court intervention by choosing not to raise certain types of claims.
The corollary – that litigants can expand the scope of court intervention by
153

Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 940 (2012).
Id. at 940.
155 Id. at 944.
156 Id. at 941.
157 Id. at 942.
158 Id. at 944.
159 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307-17 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
160 Id. at 313.
161 Id. at 312.
162 Id. at 301 (plurality opinion).
154
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raising additional claims – is no less important. This influence becomes
particularly clear when litigants successfully prosecute a novel claim. An
illustration of this phenomenon emerged in the context of racial
gerrymandering. In Shaw v. Reno,163 the Supreme Court introduced a new
doctrine into the redistricting canon. Its decision directly affected the district
maps that would govern congressional elections in North Carolina and set an
important precedent that would alter current and future maps across the
country. Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court did not break this new legal
ground without litigant assistance; to the contrary, it was the decision by five
North Carolina residents to bring the novel claim that gave the court the power
to articulate this “entirely new cause of action.”164 The majority acknowledged
as much: an “understanding of the nature of appellants’ claim [was] critical to
[its] resolution of the case.”165
In short, claim selection is a powerful tool in the context of redistricting. It
potentially determines which legal standards will be enforced with respect to
which electoral districts, and it directly affects the balance of power between
agents empowered to draw district lines. Given the stakes, it is a profound
power potentially available to redistricting litigants.
Yet the procedural rules do little to mitigate this phenomenon. To the
contrary, while certain judicially created doctrines – such as doctrines relating
to standing and laches – normally impose limits on litigants’ abilities to engage
in claim selection, these doctrines tend to have little bite in redistricting
litigation. The permissive nature of the federal standing doctrine already has
been discussed,166 and its application is no less forgiving in the context of
claim selection. The flexible standing doctrine, in other words, circumvents
standing-related barriers that otherwise might affect litigants’ abilities to select
claims.
The distinct doctrine of laches likewise has been applied in the redistricting
context in a largely ineffectual fashion. This doctrine, which “penalizes a
litigant for negligent or willful failure to assert his rights” through dismissal of
that litigant’s otherwise meritorious claim, normally is a formidable doctrine
governing lawsuits in equity.167 And in theory, “[t]he defense applies to
redistricting cases as it does to any other.”168 Yet when adjudicating
redistricting cases, many courts have expressed reluctance in applying the

163

509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993).
Id. at 659 (White, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 641 (majority opinion).
166 See supra Part II.A.1.a.
167 Perry v. Judd, 840 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953 (E.D. Va. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp., 464 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.
1972)).
168 Arizona Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 366 F. Supp. 2d 887, 908 (D. Ariz. 2005). But see infra note 174 (discussing the
limited holding of this case).
164
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doctrine.169 Even when plaintiffs have sought to challenge a district plan years
after it was first put in place, courts have rejected laches defenses based on
various grounds, including the “ongoing nature of the violation,”170 that
redistricting challenges are distinguishable from “challenges to specific
election procedures made after the election process had begun,”171 because
intervening Supreme Court opinions “created a new ballgame,”172 or even
because “[f]rom a political standpoint the delay . . . [was] understandable.”173
Others have gone so far as to conclude that the doctrine simply does not apply
to certain types of redistricting claims.174
In short, the doctrines of standing and laches lack the force they have in
other contexts. These doctrinal shortcomings, coupled with the high degree of
flexibility normally accorded to parties selecting claims, grant litigants a robust
ability to determine which district lines are potentially subject to judicial
redistricting. It is by using this mechanism of claim selection that redistricting
litigants – not redistricting courts, not primary redistricting agents, and not the
electorate at large – are able to set the courts’ agendas in powerful and
consequential ways.
2.

The Neglect of an Unrepresented Class

At the same time that redistricting litigation is so hospitable to litigants, it
offers few protections to non-litigants. Initially, this may seem unremarkable:
civil litigation rarely protects those not appearing in court. Yet this default rule
flips – most prominently, in the class-action setting – when non-litigants will
169 See, e.g., Garza v. Cnty. of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 772 (9th Cir. 1990); Blackmoon v.
Charles Mix Cnty., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (D.S.D. 2005); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F.
Supp. 196, 203 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
170 Garza, 918 F.2d at 772; see also, e.g., Jeffers, 730 F. Supp. at 202.
171 Pac for Middle Am. v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 95 C 827, 1995 WL 571887, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 1995).
172 Id. at *4.
173 Rojas v. Moriarty, No. 91-1113-CV-W-6, 1994 WL 114669, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Mo.
Mar. 25, 1994).
174 See, e.g., Shapiro v. State, 336 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (D. Md. 1972) (questioning
whether it ever would be “proper to dismiss a suit on the ground of laches and thus forever
bar an appropriate judicial inquiry into the merits of an otherwise properly alleged cause of
action based on ‘racial gerrymandering’ of congressional districts”); cf. Jeffers, 730 F. Supp.
at 203 (“We will not say to these plaintiffs, ‘Wait for another census. The time is not yet
ripe.’ They have heard these words too many times in the past.”). It is true that the doctrine
is not entirely dead: occasionally, courts have rejected redistricting claims based on laches.
Yet even in these instances, courts generally invoke the doctrine only when it appears the
claim has no potential to affect an actual election, or, at most, when the claim, if successful
and somehow adjudicated in time, could affect only one rapidly approaching election before
the decennial redistricting mandate would restart the litigation clock. See, e.g., White v.
Daniel, 909 F.2d 99, 103 (4th Cir. 1990); Arizona Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v.
Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 366 F. Supp. 2d 887, 907-09 (D. Ariz. 2005).
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be bound by the court’s decision. In such a scenario, litigants and courts
normally owe some duty to the affected non-parties.
As a practical matter, redistricting litigation in many respects falls into this
same category. Voters across an entire jurisdiction are affected in a profound
and irreversible way when a court requires that an election go forward pursuant
to an altered electoral map. Moreover, in light of the principles of stare decisis,
the claims normally cannot be relitigated.175 And even if they could be, the
realities of the election cycle mean that at least one election is likely to have
occurred before the next round of challenges can be heard.
Yet redistricting litigation fails to trigger protections analogous to those
provided in the class-action context.176 There is no requirement that the legal
representation be adequate; there is no inquiry into whether the plaintiffs’
claims are typical; potential conflicts between attorneys and nonlitigants are
never explored; and no one acts as a fiduciary. Given the permissiveness of
such a regime, it comes as little surprise that few litigants elect to pursue the
procedurally more cumbersome route required by a class action, a decision
made even more sensible – at least, from a plaintiff’s perspective – once it is
recognized that the advantages of bringing a class action, including the ability
to avoid mootness challenges and to seek far-reaching claims and remedies, are
available to individual redistricting litigants simply as a matter of course.177
These tensions signal the procedurally problematic nature of redistricting
litigation. Indeed, redistricting litigation displays many of the same traits as
another particularly difficult form of litigation: litigation defined by what
Professor Nagareda has termed “embedded aggregation.”178 In each
manifestation of embedded aggregation,
a doctrinal feature of what is ostensibly individual litigation – the scope
of the right of action asserted, the nature of the remedy sought, or the
character of the wrong alleged – gives rise to demands for the suit to bind
nonparties in some fashion, beyond the ordinary stare decisis effect that
any case might exert. . . . An aggregate dimension, in short, is

175

See, e.g., Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d 711, 736 &
n.24 (Pa. 2012) (referring to the “bedrock rule of jurisprudence involving precedent and
stare decisis” that precludes litigants from challenging redistricting plans based on some
“materially indistinguishable challenge” that already was raised and rejected in a prior
decision).
176 While it is true that some litigants do bring redistricting claims as class actions, that is
the exception. See, e.g., Newman v. Hunt, 787 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Ramos v.
Illinois, 781 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
177 See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the ways that procedural rules shift in response to the
exigencies of the election cycle, which facilitates the resolution of claims before they
become moot); supra text accompanying note 143-144 (discussing flexibility in claim
selection); supra notes 67-72, 185 and accompanying text (discussing scope of remedy).
178 Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
1105, 1108 (2010).
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“embedded” doctrinally within what appears to be an individual
lawsuit.179
As Professor Nagareda defines the phenomenon, “[a] situation of embedded
aggregation arises whenever any of [the three doctrinal features identified
above] extends beyond the plaintiff in an individual lawsuit.”180 In redistricting
litigation – a form of litigation that Professor Nagareda does not address,
despite its aggregative features – all three of these doctrinal features extend
well beyond the individual plaintiff.
The first feature concerns the scope of the right of action asserted. An
example is the Freedom of Information Act, “a federal statute that confers an
undifferentiated right upon ‘any person’ to request the disclosure of ‘records’
held by the federal government” and therefore that has a “universe of potential
claimants . . . without legal limits.”181 In redistricting cases, the scope of the
right of action likewise has an “extraordinary breadth.”182 As discussed above,
for example, it is routine for millions of voters to have undifferentiated equal
representation claims.183 And once the possibility of litigant proxies is taken
into account, the universe of potential claimants, at least as a practical matter,
is similarly without legal limits.
The second feature identified by Professor Nagareda addresses the “remedy
the plaintiff seeks,” with the “important distinction concern[ing] the divisibility

179 Id. at 1105-09. Whether redistricting litigation satisfies the definition of embedded
aggregation provided by Professor Nagareda turns on whether redistricting-related demands
to bind non-parties are coterminous with what his Article refers to as “ordinary stare
decisis.” Certainly there have been, in the redistricting context, demands to bind non-parties
outside the context of stare decisis. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529, 1557
(N.D. Fla. 1995) (identifying the defendant’s argument that “plaintiffs are collaterally
estopped from bringing this suit because they could have intervened in, and prosecuted their
claims in, the earlier case,” but rejecting this argument in light of intervening changes in the
law and factual circumstances). It nevertheless remains true that redistricting-related
precedents become binding on non-parties primarily through the operation of stare decisis.
Still, the application of this doctrine in the context of redistricting has sweeping effects
across entire populations, and there are, as a practical matter, other ways in which nonlitigants are bound: once an election takes place pursuant to a particular court order, for
example, it cannot be undone even by a successful subsequent redistricting-related
challenge. In any event, whether this all constitutes the “ordinary stare decisis effect” for
purposes of defining embedded aggregation seems less important than recognizing that, in
the redistricting context, non-parties are predictably and profoundly affected by party
activity. Indeed, as Professor Nagareda himself acknowledges, while his primary concerns
extend beyond the “routine operation” of the stare decisis doctrine, his discussions do “not
turn on any absolute, categorical separation between embedded aggregation and stare
decisis.” Nagareda, supra note 178, at 1116 n.39.
180 Nagareda, supra note 178, at 1112.
181 Id. at 1109.
182 Id. at 1117 (discussing the scope of the right under the Freedom of Information Act).
183 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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of the remedy – whether it is such that the court could, as a practical matter,
afford it to the plaintiff at hand without affecting the application or availability
of the same remedy to other persons who are nonparties to the plaintiff’s
lawsuit.”184 Redistricting litigation again provides a robust illustration of this
feature, as the remedies in redistricting litigation are both sweeping and
indivisible. Indeed, it is standard practice for a court hearing a successful equal
representation challenge to redraw the entire map, not simply the districts in
which the plaintiffs are residing.185 Indeed, as a purely logistical matter, it may
be impossible to redraw one district line without affecting many others. In any
event, come election time, there can be only one map governing the
proceedings.
The final feature relates to “the nature of the underlying wrong that a civil
lawsuit alleges,” where “the important question is whether the wrong is of such
a nature as to affect a multitude of persons.”186 Once again, redistricting
provides a clear example of the phenomenon. The underlying wrong – the
failure of the primary redistricting agents to redistrict pursuant to law – affects,
at a minimum, every voter within the relevant district.
In short, redistricting litigation tends to affect non-parties in ways that, in
certain important respects, track class actions and other forms of aggregative
litigation, embedded or otherwise – and therefore that would seem to make it a
leading candidate for class-action-type protections. But it does not trigger these
protections. The uncomfortable tension becomes stark when litigants
occasionally do choose to bring redistricting claims as class actions,187 and,
even more tellingly, when they include allegations relating to class-action
requirements, such as typicality and adequacy, but fail actually to seek classaction certification.188 The latter form of pleading serves no legal purpose. It
instead reveals litigants’ anxiety over the nature of redistricting litigation.
The anxiety is appropriate. Tellingly, of the three examples identified in
Professor Nagareda’s explication of embedded aggregation, only two have
been subjected to court review, and in both cases the Supreme Court refused to
sanction the relevant practice. Citing concerns over fairness and due process,
184

Nagareda, supra note 178, at 1118.
Recently in New York, for example, a federal court hearing challenges related to the
2010 cycle redrew districts across the state even though the plaintiffs and interveners in the
case resided in fewer than a dozen of the state’s sixty-two counties. Only one challenger, a
resident of Tompkins County, resided outside the southeast part of the state, and none
resided in Western New York, the North Country, or the Adirondacks. See Opinion and
Order, Favors v. Cuomo, No. 11-CV-5632, 2012 WL 928223 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012).
Various filings submitted in the litigation by the over thirty plaintiffs and interveners
include information about the residence of each. These filings are available at https://www.n
yed.uscourts.gov/11-5632.cfm and are on file with the author.
186 Nagareda, supra note 178, at 1120.
187 See supra note 176.
188 See Complaint at 6, Hippert v. Ritchie, No. 11-cv-00093 (D. Minn. filed Jan. 21,
2011); Complaint at 2, Britton v. Ritchie, No. 11-cv-00093 (D. Minn. filed Jan. 12, 2011).
185
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the Court “ultimately limit[ed] what an individual lawsuit may do out of
concern that the lawsuit would otherwise operate as a de facto class action.”189
In other words, the Court pushed back on courts seeking to permit forms of
embedded aggregation. By contrast, in the Supreme Court’s most recent forays
into redistricting, nowhere were questions of aggregation and representation
even raised.190
In short, redistricting litigation not only fails to protect the interests of nonparties; it does so in a way that, in other contexts, has triggered calls for serious
procedural protections. For non-litigant voters, therefore, there continue to be
no formal protections as redistricting litigation unfolds. And, as discussed
above, there is little reason to think all interests are being adequately
represented in the cases at bar. The upshot is a particular form of litigation –
not a conventional one-on-one lawsuit, not a class action – that accords great
power to those who elect to litigate.
3.

Election Exigencies and Procedural Oddities

A final defining feature of redistricting litigation is its dramatic procedural
response to the exigencies of the election cycle. In the redistricting context, the
pressures of timing have produced a shifting regime of legal standards, one that
creates an unusual compression of civil procedure. Litigants aware of such
shifts in procedure can employ various techniques to affect the likelihood of
triggering this alternative legal regime. Combined with the other distinctive
features of redistricting litigation, these procedural oddities make redistricting
litigation even more conducive to manipulation by litigants.
At its core, the shifting regime of legal standards relates to timing. Timing is
critical in the redistricting context; it is hardly an exaggeration to state that
“election-related dates drive redistricting litigation.”191 The election cycle
renders deadlines in redistricting litigation notoriously tight, with redistricting
courts routinely required to adjudicate complicated and fact-intensive
challenges under “severe time constraints.”192 These pressures exist in part
because elections cannot be put indefinitely on hold.193 The intense time
189 Nagareda, supra note 178, at 1121 (discussing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880
(2008), and Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007)).
190 Tennant v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 3 (2012); Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct.
934 (2012).
191 BRUCE M. CLARKE & ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REDISTRICTING
LITIGATION: AN OVERVIEW OF LEGAL, STATISTICAL, AND CASE-MANAGEMENT ISSUES 65
(2002); see also Persily, supra note 93, at 1146-47 (describing the “series of frenzied
twenty-four-hour days that often precede a court-drawn plan”).
192 Supplemental Opinion at 10, Perry v. Perez, No. 11-CA-360, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
155601 (Dec. 2, 2011), overruled on other grounds by Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012);
see also, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
193 This is true even though courts do have a limited ability to delay certain elections.
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Monterey Cnty., 808 F. Supp. 727, 733 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (delaying
special election to permit primary redistricting agents time to “consider the competing
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pressures associated with the election cycle also alter the ways in which courts
adjudicate cases. At a certain point, time constraints require an expediting of
the proceedings – even if it means changing important procedural rules. It is in
this context that the importance of timing becomes unmistakable.
To ensure that district lines, even temporary ones, are in place for each
election, the procedural rules governing redistricting lawsuits temporarily
change in response to time constraints. They do so by shifting power among
redistricting agents, by altering the standards for relief, and by affecting the
timing of relief.
The most drastic changes resulting from time pressure concern the balance
of power among agents drawing electoral lines. A sufficient delay in statecourt proceedings, for example, shifts power away from state courts. This is a
result of the so-called Growe doctrine, which normally requires that federal
courts defer from ruling on certain redistricting claims if litigation is still
pending in state court.194 This rule is important for a host of reasons; among
other things, it dictates which set of judges, federal or state, will be
adjudicating the relevant case. This limitation on the federal courts evaporates,
however, if it appears the state court will not reach a timely ruling.195 In other
words, sufficient delay permits – indeed, requires – a federal court that
otherwise would stay its proceedings to engage in judicial redistricting. Those
dissatisfied with state-court proceedings can benefit profoundly from the shift
in forum.196
There is an analogous shift in power away from state legislatures. As
elections draw nearer, the ability, willingness, and obligation of courts to defer
to primary redistricting agents all decrease. Normally, if a court concludes that
a legislatively enacted map suffers from some legal flaw, it must provide the
legislature time to remedy that map before it will implement a court-drawn
version.197 If, however, the court concludes that, in light of election-related
deadlines, there is not enough time for the legislature to act, it will bypass this
step and directly implement a court-drawn map.198 The California Supreme
Court’s description of its predicament after the 1980 redistricting cycle is
illustrative:

interests in [the] case”).
194 Growe, 507 U.S. at 37.
195 Id. at 36 (“[The District Court] of course . . . would have been justified in adopting its
own plan if it had been apparent that the state court . . . would not develop a redistricting
plan in time for the primaries.”); see also, e.g., Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v.
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 366 F. Supp. 2d 887, 900 (2005).
196 Indeed, Growe itself demonstrated the outcome-determinative effects that this shift in
forum can have on an electoral map. 507 U.S. at 28-31 (describing different results reached
by state and federal courts adjudicating redistricting challenges that, in relevant part, were
identical).
197 See, e.g., Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 261-62 (2003).
198 Id. at 265; see also Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d. 529, 536 (S.D. Miss. 2002).
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The options available to the court are limited. Were time constraints
less pressing, the court might consider requesting the Legislature to
develop an interim plan. However, the June primary is less than five
months away. . . . [N]o new districts could be put into effect in time to
inform the electorate and the candidates of their districts before the
primary election.199
Those challenging the work of primary redistricting agents can, through this
changed approach, profit from delay.
Finally, time pressures can shift power away from appellate courts, thereby
increasing the power of trial courts in a manner that magnifies the effect of
forum selection. Normally, a trial court judgment addressing a matter as
inexorably intertwined with the public interest as redistricting would be a
logical candidate for a stay pending appellate review.200 When elections are
imminent, however, there may not be enough time for such protections, and,
when that occurs, trial court redistricting decisions are generally the ones that
control. It is as a result of this reality that the Supreme Court has expressly
acknowledged the “improbability of completing judicial review before the
necessary deadline for a new redistricting scheme.”201 Litigants preferring the
composition of a particular trial court bench to the appellate court bench – a
reasonable distinction, particularly where judiciaries appear politicized –
therefore benefit from dragging their heels.
A second category of timing-related transformations relates to the standards
for relief. The Supreme Court recently concluded that when elections are
sufficiently close in time and a legislatively enacted redistricting plan faces
challenges under the Constitution or section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the
district court is both empowered and required to redraw the map in a manner
that responds to those challenges if the plaintiffs have shown a mere
“likelihood of success on the merits.”202 While this is a “familiar standard,”203
one normally applicable when plaintiffs are seeking a preliminary
199

Assembly of the State v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939, 951 (Cal. 1982). The posture of
this case was unusual, and it resulted, in effect, in a court-drawn plan that was identical to a
legislatively enacted plan. Id. at 961. The court’s discussion nevertheless provides helpful
insight into the effects of time pressures.
200 See, e.g., Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (identifying the four factors
governing the grant of a stay pending appeal as “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a
strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure
the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
201 Growe, 507 U.S. at 35.
202 Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 942 (2012) (“Where a State’s plan faces challenges
under the Constitution or § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a district court should still be guided
by that plan, except to the extent those legal challenges are shown to have a likelihood of
success on the merits.”).
203 Id.
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injunction,204 its familiarity does not detract from the fact that the standards for
relief have shifted as a result of time pressures. The shift becomes even starker
in the context of certain types of challenges related to section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, an unusual provision that, among other things, shifts the burden to
the state to prove the validity of a district map.205 Under certain circumstances
related to the timing of an approaching election, the standard for challenges
related to section 5 is not one of success on the merits, or even likelihood of
success on the merits, but rather one of “reasonable probability.”206 In short,
the standards for proving violations, and therefore for replacing legislatively
drawn lines with judicially drawn lines, change as an election draws nearer.
A final effect of time pressure relates to what one court has referred to as
“the timing of relief.”207 If a court concludes that, on account of time pressures,
it would not be practicable for a jurisdiction to implement certain legally
required changes prior to an election, the court may be willing to postpone the
implementation of some or all of those changes. A federal court in
Pennsylvania recently relied on these principles, for example, when it refused
to redraw district lines and ordered that the jurisdiction instead rely on maps
drawn over ten years earlier.208 Although the older maps were clearly invalid in
light of the equal representation doctrine,209 the court explained that there are
“‘certain circumstances, such as where an impending election is imminent and
a State’s election machinery is already in progress,’ in which a court may
withhold the granting of relief, even if the existing apportionment scheme is
found to be invalid.”210 Were the time pressure less severe, the requested relief
– in this instance, an altered district map – almost certainly would have been
available.
In these three important respects – relating to the balance of power among
redistricting agents, the standards for relief, and the timing of court-imposed
remedies – the rules in redistricting litigation transform as an election draws
204

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
206 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 942. (“And by ‘reasonable probability’ this Court means in
this context that the § 5 challenge is not insubstantial.”). This standard arose out of a
procedurally complicated line of litigation that involved two sets of parallel federal
proceedings and a court tasked with imposing an interim map without the benefit of recently
pre-cleared district lines. The procedural complications presented in this case, while
extensive, would not have necessitated a shift in the procedural rules had there been enough
time for the courts to adjudicate the relevant claims. It is worth noting that this particular
shift in the standards can assist defendants as well as plaintiffs. By relying on this standard,
a jurisdiction defending its map may be able to circumvent (or, at least, delay) the full brunt
of the section 5 preclearance requirement.
207 Pileggi v. Aichele, 843 F. Supp. 2d 584, 593 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964)).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 589.
210 Id. at 593 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 585).
205
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closer. These temporary changes have lasting effects: even if the rules
eventually are restored and the maps eventually redrawn, interim maps govern
interim elections. The elections held in North Carolina in the 1990s provide a
vivid illustration of the consequences. In early 1992 plaintiffs filed a lawsuit
challenging the state’s newly drawn congressional districts.211 Although the
challenges ultimately were successful, it took over six years for the litigation to
affect the congressional maps actually used in an election. In other words, a
district plan later held to be unconstitutional governed North Carolina’s
elections in 1992, 1994, and 1996, and for those constitutional violations there
was no retroactive remedy to be had.212
The temporary changes also are unusual. While it is true that the standards
for any sort of court-ordered relief do change in response to certain timing
pressures – as, for example, when a litigant pursues preliminary relief and must
establish a mere likelihood of success on the merits – the multifaceted
compression of civil procedure that occurs in the redistricting context is highly
atypical. The scope of all the changes, the lasting effects of interim relief, and
the predictability of the timing crunch combine to create a date-dependent legal
regime that shifts in significant ways as an election draws nearer.
The predictability matters, for these temporary changes are susceptible to
manipulation by litigants. Litigants can speed up or slow down litigation by,
among other things, filing (or declining to file) time-consuming motions,
adjusting discovery demands, and carefully scheduling the filing of their
claims. They also can simply ask: litigants routinely propose scheduling orders
and petition courts for extensions or expedition of time.213 It is by employing
these tools that redistricting litigants can work to trigger shifts in the legal
211

Daniel P. Tokaji, Representation & Raceblindness: The Story of Shaw v. Reno, in
RACE LAW STORIES 513, 516 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008); see also
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 901-02 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655-56 (1993).
212 Tokaji, supra note 211, at 532. It was not until 1998 – and not until the case had made
two trips to the Supreme Court – that an election was held pursuant to a plan altered in
response to the legal challenge. Id. at 516-35. Even this was not the end of the litigation.
Related challenges went back to the Supreme Court another two times before the start of the
next cycle (that is, before the 2000 census data was released). See id. at 534 (“For the fourth
time in eight years of litigation over North Carolina’s congressional districts, the Supreme
Court had reversed the three-judge district court.”).
213 See, e.g., Letter to the Court, Favors v. Cuomo, No. 11-Civ.-5632 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8,
2011), available at https://ecf.nyed.uscourts.gov/dropbox/324457/1.11.cv.5632.6528965.0.p
df (requesting extension of time); Joint Advisory to the Court Regarding Submission of
Proposed Interim Court Ordered Plans, Davis v. Perry, No. 5:11-cv-00360, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 28, 2011), available at https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxeOfQQnUr_gZDYyNDFjYm
YtM2Y1Zi00OTJhLWI1MGItYjY0MmM3YzQ4MzZh/edit (setting forth parties’ proposed
lengths of time and dates for hearings); see also Order, Perry, No. 5:11-cv-00360 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 8, 2011), available at https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxeOfQQnUr_gMjk2Nzkz
ZjItNWI3Ni00YmQ0LTkzMjItYjYzNzM0NTAzYmNi/edit?pli=1 (requesting from the
parties briefing on whether a trial should proceed or be delayed).

608

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:563

standards and take advantage of the procedural oddities characterizing
redistricting litigation.214
It is therefore not surprising to find examples of redistricting litigants trying
to manipulate timing – or at least accusing each other of the same. The parties
before the Supreme Court in the redistricting case that recently came out of
Texas, for example, all pointed fingers at one another with respect to the
perceived delay: lawyers for the state accused others of delaying proceedings
through “interventions and discovery opposed by the State of Texas,”215 while
lawyers for other parties accused Texas of causing delay through “dilatory
litigation choices,” such as “insist[ing] on pursuing summary judgment” and
refusing to agree to a “quick trial date.”216 Even the district court judges
acknowledged the control over timing exercised by these litigants,217 and theirs
is far from the only judicial commentary on the subject. Judges occasionally
criticize redistricting litigants for perceived delay tactics,218 and on somewhat
rarer occasion compliment parties for their efforts in streamlining litigation.219
214 It is true that there are limitations on what litigants can control. These limitations may
be practical, strategic, a byproduct of the adversarial method, or a result of courts’ casemanagement tools. See, e.g., CLARKE & REAGAN, supra note 191, at 65-71. Litigants
nevertheless retain significant influence over the timing of litigation.
215 Emergency Application for Stay of Interlocutory Order Directing Implementation of
Interim Texas House of Representatives Redistricting Plan Pending Appeal to the United
States Supreme Court at 4, Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (No. 11A536); see also
Abbott Accuses DOJ of Stalling; DOJ Fires Back, TEX. REDISTRICTING & ELECTION L. (Dec.
1, 2011, 9:59 PM), http://txredistricting.org/post/13621218808/abbott-accuses-doj-of-stallin
g-doj-fires-back.
216 Joint Response of Rodriguez Respondents et al. in Opposition to Texas’s Emergency
Application for Stay & Injunction at 4, 24, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 934 (No. 11A536).
217 See Respondents Texas Latino Redistricting Task Force et al. Joint Brief in
Opposition to Emergency Application for Stay of Interlocutory Order Directing
Implementation of Interim Congressional Redistricting Plan Pending Appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 934 (No. 11A536) (quoting the district court in a
related case as stating, with respect to scheduling issues, that “‘at the moment it’s Texas’
lawsuit and Texas’ motion for summary judgment, and that’s what we’re scheduling’”
(quoting Transcript of Telephonic Conference at 33-34, Texas v. United States, No. 1:11-cv01303 (D.D.C 2012)). Later, in the original case, the three-judge panel issued an order
emphasizing the need for the parties to cooperate to get a timely map in place: “It is the
Court’s desire to have redistricting plans in place for an April primary and all parties must
continue their negotiations to assist the Court in accomplishing that task.” Order, Perez v.
Texas, 2012 WL 4094933 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (No. 11-CA-360).
218
See, e.g., Baldus v. Members of the Wisconsin Gov’t Accountability Bd., 843 F.
Supp. 2d 955, 960 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (referring to the “the sandbagging, hide-the-ball trial
tactics that continue to be employed” and asserting that “[n]either this Court, the parties in
the case, nor Wisconsin’s citizens have the interest or time to endure the litigation tactics
being used by public officials or their private counsel”); cf. Badham v. U.S. Dist. Court, 721
F.2d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Defendants argue that the Republicans themselves have
been guilty of delay and have not pursued diligently their claims in state court. They
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The commentary by these judges provides further support for the conclusion
that litigants tend to have significant control over the timing of litigation.
Particularly in the redistricting context, where time pressures change the rules
that govern redistricting litigation, this control over timing can serve as a
powerful strategic tool. These changes in the rules unquestionably affect the
process and have the potential to affect the lines themselves.
In short, a defining feature of redistricting litigation is the unusual
compression of civil procedure that begins as an election approaches and that
encourages procedural manipulation. This attribute, coupled with the regime’s
accommodation of litigants and its neglect of nonparties, together make the
larger point: litigating as redistricting – far from being the purely courtdominated practice that the literature would suggest – is highly susceptible to
litigant control. This, in turn, makes for a remarkable form of redistricting.
B.

A Curious Form of Redistricting

Redistricting litigants, as explained above, benefit from a significant
delegation of authority by a system that relies on them as critical agents of
fallback redistricting. This, in turn, produces a form of redistricting that is
remarkable in at least three fundamental respects. Namely, the regime relies on
actors who are not representative of the general electorate; it grants them a
staggering amount of power; and it requires that these actors exercise their
power through opaque and indirect means.
Litigating is a remarkable form of redistricting, perhaps most significantly,
because of its reliance on a group of actors that is in no sense representative of
the electorate as a whole. In the context of redistricting, this is unusual. Other
redistricting agents – members of state legislatures, commission members, and
even judges – are in some sense representative of the communities they serve;
each has either been elected or appointed by those who have been elected. Not
so with redistricting litigants. Quite to the contrary, the composition of this
group is defined by the particular collection of traits identified above,220 and as
such, the litigants behind any given lawsuit are unlikely to be representative of
the electorate. Rather, they are, in all likelihood, representative of major
political parties, prominent interest groups, and others with significant
financial backing and the most directly at stake. The result is a reliance on
actors who, at best, lack incentives to represent broad interests and who tend to

contend further that absent such delaying tactics, the Republicans would have already had a
swift resolution of their state law claims in state court. The argument is premature.”).
219
Navajo Nation v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 230 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1016
n.23 (D. Ariz. 2002) (“The Court commends the attorneys and parties for working
diligently, cooperatively, and with ingenuity to narrow the issues regarding the DOJ’s
objections and for compromising on an interim plan for the 2002 elections. What was
initially anticipated to be lengthy litigation was significantly diminished by [various actions
taken by the litigants and in particular the DOJ].”).
220 See supra Part I.A.
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favor certain results. It is no coincidence, for example, that redistricting
litigants sometimes are able to reach a “political compromise” that “partition[s]
the state so as to lock in the political status quo ante.”221 Moreover, those likely
to benefit the most from this form of redistricting are, ironically enough, those
who failed to achieve majority rule in the relevant jurisdiction. As Professor
Cain has explained, it is predictably the losers who initiate litigation:
In particular, redistricting is bedeviled by the sore loser problem: because
new district lines can determine the electoral fates of candidates, political
parties, and interest groups, it is usually worth their time and effort to
overturn a plan that they do not like for the uncertain prospect of
something better.222
The composition of this non-representative group helps to explain the concern
– voiced periodically by the few who have acknowledged the role litigants
might play in redistricting – that redistricting litigation may be subject to
“partisan capture.”223
The effects of this lack of representativeness are then compounded, in this
strange form of redistricting, by a systemic failure to protect non-litigants. As
discussed above, though entire electorates are affected in a profound way by
the actions of the redistricting litigants, no formal mechanism ensures their
interests will be taken into account. While the opaque nature of the
redistricting litigants makes it difficult to identify exactly whose interests are
being ignored, perhaps the most obvious target are those who would benefit
from a “competitive electoral process.”224 Litigants often have an incentive to
reach mutually beneficial compromises – either explicitly, through settlement,
or implicitly, through a bilateral decision not to bring certain claims – that
favor the political status quo. Such a result is particularly troubling to those
“commit[ted] to the competitive integrity of the political process as an
indispensable guarantor of democratic constitutionalism.”225
It is true that the involvement of the courts, which are both more
representative and more transparent than are litigants, helps to counteract the
power exercised by the latter group. But it far from erases it. Particularly when
litigants exercise so much control over the courts themselves, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that significant redistricting power has been delegated in
a manner that fails to protect all affected parties.
This underscores another reason why litigating is a remarkable form of
redistricting: namely, redistricting litigants are given a staggering amount of
power. The various powers exercised by redistricting litigants throughout the
221

Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 598, 600 (discussing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973), which the author sharply criticizes as “insult[ing] [] the competitiveness of the
process resulting from the ability of insiders to lessen competitive pressures”).
222 Cain, supra note 2, at 1836.
223 See Cox, supra note 89, at 800; Karlan, supra note 63, at 1733.
224 Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 615.
225 Id. (describing the “political markets” approach).
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life of a lawsuit – and even before, through the threat of litigation, and after,
through the precedential effects of a decision – combine to create a regime in
which the participation of litigants, taken in sum, plays a profoundly
consequential role in redistricting. Certain manifestations of their influence (as
illustrated, for example, through the mechanisms of forum selection, claim
selection, and manipulation of timing)226 confirm the reach of this power.
It nevertheless does remain difficult to determine precisely the degree of
influence that a litigant has over a case. This uncertainty, in turn, relates to a
third remarkable quality of litigating as redistricting. The power litigants
exercise often must be employed through opaque and indirect means. Forum
selection is one example of this phenomenon. Another example is the ability
litigants have to manipulate timing and thereby to trigger the shift in rules that
depends on timing. These complicated legal mechanisms are both difficult to
measure and hard to explain to a layperson, thereby compounding the
transparency problems already affecting this form of redistricting. The indirect
nature of these processes also ensures that the results will not always be what
are intended. If nothing else, the divide between the desired outcomes and the
means employed adds a significant degree of randomness into the process.
In short, litigating presents a strange model for redistricting. It delegates
significant authority to a non-representative group of actors, and it requires that
they employ their power in ways that are opaque and indirect. It is a form of
redistricting that leads to serious normative concerns.
III. A TROUBLING DELEGATION
The delegation of authority to redistricting litigants, described in detail
above, is complicated and consequential. It is also deeply troubling. Its more
problematic qualities threaten to undermine the quality of the outcomes,
efficiency, and legitimacy of the redistricting process. Combined, these
concerns suggest a regime in need of examination and, quite possibly, reform.
This Part, which explores the normative implications of litigant participation in
the redistricting process, concludes with a discussion of reforms that, if
adopted, may help to achieve a more sensible delegation of democratic design.
A.

The Normative Implications of Litigant Participation

The participation of litigants threatens to jeopardize several fundamental
aspects of the redistricting process, including the quality of its outcomes. As
discussed above, the delegation of authority to litigants permits these actors, to
a significant though somewhat unpredictable extent, to control the district lines
that ultimately govern elections. Litigants exercise this control through
techniques as broad as refusing to bring challenges that do not advance their
interests, and as subtle as delaying litigation in the hopes of triggering a more
favorable set of rules. Does this influence tend to produce better redistricting

226

See supra Part II.A.

612

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:563

outcomes? To answer this question in full, one must engage in the difficult, or
perhaps impossible, project of determining a normative baseline for
redistricting maps. Yet even taking litigant redistricting on its own terms
indicates cause for concern. Litigants’ power to redistrict stems from their
ability to enforce constitutional and statutory rules.227 As a result, to defend
litigant participation in redistricting, one might argue that litigant participation
improves redistricting outcomes by making the outcomes more consistent with
governing legal standards.
Surely this occurs to some extent. There is, in other words, a persuasive
argument to be made that the participation of litigants tends to produce maps
that are at least somewhat more consistent with the relevant legal standards
than are maps produced in their absence. The approach nevertheless has a
number of potential defects in the manner in which litigants work toward this
end. At the outset, there is little reason to believe that litigants’ interests
necessarily align with those of the electorate at large. As such, there is little
reason to believe that litigants will make decisions likely to produce the maps
most consistent with the governing legal standards, rather than most likely to
achieve their preferred outcomes. Forum, for example, is selected not to secure
the most competent judge, but rather the most favorable; claims are selected
not in response to a neutral assessment of the merits, but rather in light of the
practical needs of clients. With respect to matters of timing, such concerns
grow even more acute: timing-related mechanisms have the potential to
undermine, rather than promote, the enforcement of legal norms through
reliance on interim maps, abbreviated appellate review, and relaxed legal
standards governing relief. These examples are merely illustrative. Throughout
the redistricting process, litigants rely on tools that, at best, do not fit perfectly
the ends they may be meant to accomplish and, at worst, are subversive. To the
extent redistricting litigation is characterized by these more negative qualities –
a lack of representativeness, subjectivity to procedural manipulation, and a
certain degree of randomness – it is difficult to conclude that this approach is
likely to produce the most normatively desirable maps.
Many of these considerations also lead to a second normative concern,
relating to efficiency. By relying so heavily on litigants (particularly where
litigation is the only form of fallback redistricting), jurisdictions force
redistricting to proceed through the mechanisms of civil litigation, which is
many things, but rarely efficient.228 To the contrary, litigation is notoriously
227

Indeed, it is not obvious how these rules would be enforced in their absence. Even
when scholars debate how best to enforce these standards, the discussions normally concern
the type of challenges litigants should bring, not whether litigants should participate at all.
See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker
v. Carr and its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1418 (2002); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra
note 107, at 2292; Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and
Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 103 (2000).
228 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823 (1985) (arguing that the American system of civil litigation is inefficient as
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cumbersome, time consuming, and resource-draining. Moreover, many of
these problems may be exacerbated in the context of redistricting litigation,
which implicates factual and legal issues of great complexity, allows
participation by anyone with sufficient resources and adequate motivation to
drive the proceedings, and creates incentives for litigants to manipulate the
system in potentially subversive ways. From an efficiency standpoint,
redistricting through litigation appears far from ideal.
Finally, litigant influence has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of
the redistricting process.229 Litigation is a combative process that can
encourage negative characterizations and hostile rhetoric. Moreover, litigants’
reliance on what are perceived as “litigation tactics” – including manipulation
of timing and the other mechanisms discussed above – seems likely to strike
many observers as profoundly unfair. What is perhaps most troubling is that
most redistricting litigants are self-selected. As discussed above, no official
authority – not the electorate, not an elected political body, and not the courts –
has selected these actors to participate in the process, much less asked them to
represent any interest other than their own. To the contrary, these litigants
became redistricting agents on their own initiative – generally because they
were unable to achieve their ends through the politically accountable branches
– and they are not in any sense expected to advance others’ interests. And in
many cases, it is not even clear who may be funding or otherwise controlling a
litigant’s participation.230
It is true that certain aspects of redistricting litigation have at least the
potential to increase legitimacy. Litigants are constrained by rules and
doctrines; much of their work is introduced into the public record; and the
adversarial system helps to check their assertions and their arguments.
Redistricting litigants nevertheless remain, for the most part, self-appointed,
self-interested, and driven by motives and interests that are not transparent – all
while pursuing their ends through opaque and potentially subversive means.
Delegating significant authority to these actors at least threatens to undermine
the legitimacy of the redistricting process.
In sum, normative concerns emerge from the participation of litigants in the
redistricting process or, at least, from certain qualities of their participation.
The most problematic qualities might be summarized as, first, the failure to
achieve a representative body among the litigants, and, second, the ability
litigants have to manipulate proceedings through procedure. The power of
procedural manipulation both allows litigants to exercise control over the
agents meant to mediate their participation (that is, the courts) and widens the

compared to the German system).
229 As discussed above, legitimacy in this context may reflect different meanings. See
supra note 25. This Article, rather than seeking to resolve these difficult questions of
legitimacy as they relate to the participation of litigants in the redistricting process, instead
seeks to initiate the discussion.
230 See supra text accompanying note 33.
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divide between what litigants do (such as select forum) and what they seek to
achieve (in the end, to influence district lines). This collection of concerns is
serious. Yet just as there has been little analysis of redistricting litigants, there
has been little analysis of the troubling implications. As a result, there have
been, thus far, few calls for reform targeting the role that litigants play in
redistricting.
B.

Toward a More Thoughtful Delegation of Democratic Design

To address the concerns associated with redistricting litigants, it is first
necessary to acknowledge the pivotal role they play, a project this Article seeks
to inaugurate. The normative concerns emerging from such analysis in turn
reveal that those interested in reform might seek to pursue two main goals:
improved representativeness and reduced opportunities for procedural
manipulation by litigants. Pursuit of these dual goals should help to address
some of the most problematic qualities of litigant participation.
For jurisdictions seeking to implement reforms within the existing
adjudicative framework,231 there are two broad approaches that might be taken.
First, jurisdictions might seek to reform existing fallback redistricting regimes
by limiting the involvement of courts, thereby reducing the involvement of
litigants. Second, jurisdictions might regulate the ways in which litigants
participate in civil litigation. This Section provides an outline of each
approach. Although neither approach would address all normative concerns
raised by the role of litigants in the redistricting process, a sensible
combination of the two may be an important step in that direction.
1.

Reducing Reliance on Litigants

The first approach to litigant participation seeks to limit the involvement of
litigants by limiting the involvement of courts. This relatively blunt tool
pursues the relevant goals – representativeness and reduced manipulation – by
closing off the forum in which litigants exercise the most power. The most
drastic manifestation of this approach would involve a complete overruling of
the precedents that have recognized redistricting as a justiciable issue. Were
federal and state courts simply to refuse to adjudicate redistricting challenges
(citing, for example, the political question doctrine or something similar), those
decisions effectively would eliminate litigant involvement in the process.

231

One might argue that the pathologies of litigant participation in redistricting are so
great that they justify a complete rejection of the American-style system of adjudication. If
so, other adjudicative models – such as those characteristic of the German model – may be
more appropriate in this context. Cf. Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral
Exceptionalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (criticizing the model for
redistricting adopted in the United States as unusually dependent on judicialization). See
generally Langbein, supra note 228. Such analysis lies beyond the scope of this Article,
which takes as a given “[o]ur lawyer-dominated system of civil procedure.” Id. at 823.
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Half a century after the United States Supreme Court first opened its doors
to redistricting litigants in Baker v. Carr232 – a decision that Chief Justice Earl
Warren would later call “the most important case of my tenure”233 – it seems
unrealistic to think that courts across the country would change direction so
dramatically. In addition, it also seems difficult to justify such a change as an
appropriate response to the problems associated with litigant participation.
While it is true that removing courts from the process would effectively
eliminate litigant influence, it also would entirely eliminate the backstop
provided by litigant-based fallback redistricting. In the absence of some
replacement, the result would be a regime whereby primary redistricting
litigants would be able to draw electoral lines in legally indefensible ways – for
example, with the express intent of eliminating the ability of historically
disadvantaged racial groups to elect candidates of their choice – with no fear
that courts would mandate revisions. This response is unsatisfying on multiple
grounds. It addresses the lack of representativeness by ensuring that no one is
represented as a litigant, and it takes a hammer to the problem of procedural
manipulation when, as discussed below, more delicate tools may be available.
In short, a refusal by courts even to entertain redistricting challenges would be
too drastic a response to the particular problems associated with litigant
influence in redistricting.
Two alternative reforms are more measured, and therefore may be more
appropriate. First, when weighing the benefits of creating or recognizing
certain causes of action, those responsible – courts, legislators, or electorates –
might break from current practice and acknowledge the role litigants play in
enforcing these claims. This, in turn, would encourage those in charge to take
into account the costs associated with such reliance. Particularly when a cause
of action is especially vulnerable to partisan capture or otherwise proves
particularly problematic in the context of litigant enforcement, such
considerations may counsel against the adoption of a claim that necessarily
will be administered through the courts.
Second, jurisdictions that have not already done so might consider designing
and empowering alternative fallback redistricting regimes. Stated otherwise,
jurisdictions could design the process so that litigants and courts are no longer
the exclusive agents of fallback redistricting. A minority of jurisdictions
already have adopted such reforms. As discussed above, for example, the
Illinois state constitution initially empowers the legislature to draw certain
districts following the census.234 If the legislature has failed to enact a plan by
a given date, however, the constitution shifts power to a Legislative
Redistricting Commission, whose members are selected by elected officials.235

232
233
234
235

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b).
Id.

616

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:563

By empowering alternative fallback redistricting agents of this sort,
jurisdictions address a problem that occurs with regularity (and generally as a
result of legislative gridlock): the failure of primary redistricting agents to
redistrict in accordance with the decennial mandate. In the 2010 cycle, for
example, this failure affected at least eight states and nearly two dozen
electoral maps.236 When such a situation arises, well-established Supreme
Court precedent makes clear that the preexisting maps are unconstitutional and
cannot govern elections,237 and in jurisdictions where litigants and courts are
the only agents empowered to engage in fallback redistricting, the task of
redrawing the lines falls exclusively to them. Litigants in this circumstance
exercise extraordinary influence, for the maps they target must be redrawn
entirely by the courts.
When this occurs, the first backstop need not be civil litigation. Rather, an
attempt to remedy the problem initially could occur via a separate fallback
institution, such as that in Illinois, that is more transparent and more
representative. It is true that alternative fallback redistricting regimes have
their own potential to undermine the process – for example, if the proceedings
occur in secrecy or the members are corrupt – but careful structuring of these
regimes helps to address such concerns.238 It is also true that instituting such
regimes would not entirely remove litigant influence. The alternative
redistricting agents also may fail to deliver a map, and even if they do, litigants
still may sue. But by empowering an alternative set of redistricting agents,
jurisdictions at least would minimize the chance of punting the entire
redistricting project to the courts, and in this sense the jurisdictions could
reduce their reliance on redistricting litigants with respect to one of the most
problematic manifestations of the phenomenon.
Both of these reforms represent more moderate attempts at reducing litigant
participation. As such, they represent more a measured and targeted response
to the problems potentially posed by litigant influence.
2.

Regulating Litigant Participation

A second approach to reform seeks to regulate, rather than necessarily to
reduce, litigant participation. Specific changes might help to advance both of
the goals identified above: improving representativeness and reducing
opportunities for procedural manipulation. Each is addressed in turn.
To increase representativeness, jurisdictions might encourage a broader
spectrum of individuals to participate in the litigation process. Although it
would be impractical to expect throngs of new parties to file court appearances,
participation by new actors very well may be realistic if jurisdictions were to
permit and encourage courts to reach out to non-litigants. This has occurred,
for example, in Minnesota, where the judges adjudicating redistricting
236
237
238

Levitt, supra note 11.
See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
See generally Cain, supra note 2, at 1812.
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challenges scheduled hearings throughout the state in an effort to hear from
those not participating as litigants.239 The information gathered can be
particularly influential with respect to certain critical legal issues – for
example, with respect to so-called communities of interest, which is a term
referring to “group[s] of people concentrated in a geographic area who share
similar interests and priorities” and whose presence, or lack thereof, can affect
the legality of electoral maps.240 The cost of participating in hearings of this
sort is much lower than the cost of participating in litigation as a party. One
would, as a result, expect greater participation. The approach, which helps to
enhance the “voice” of non-parties,241 has much to commend it.242
The term “voice,” in this context, is borrowed from class-action scholars,243
and given the overlap between these forms of litigation, the connection is far
from coincidental. Yet while it is tempting to try to import a series of classaction-type protections into the redistricting context, it is difficult to imagine
how this translation would occur. Many of the most well-established classaction protections – which seek to ensure the numerosity of parties, the
commonality of issues, the typicality of claims, and the adequacy of counsel244
– are normally employed in a manner that assumes that the party in question
wants to obtain class-action certification. Otherwise, there is no stick: the
consequence of failing to meet the requirements is simply denial of
certification. Yet as previously observed, redistricting lawsuits need not
proceed as class actions, and most litigants have little incentive to pursue such
an approach.245 Changing that rule – that is, reversing the rule that redistricting
lawsuits need not proceed as class actions – poses its own set of logistical and
constitutional problems, particularly in situations when the failure of any party
to achieve class certification would result in the use of an outdated or
otherwise clearly unlawful map. In short, the class-action model fails to
provide an obvious framework for reform.246
Rather than attempt to force class-action protections into the redistricting
context, courts might seek to improve the representativeness of the process
through more delicate means: namely, by relying more heavily on actors who

239 Amended Order Setting Public Hearing Schedule at 2, Hippert v. Ritchie, No. A11152 (Minn. Spec. Redistricting Panel Sept. 13, 2011).
240 LEVITT, CITIZEN’S GUIDE supra note 8, at 56.
241 John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 376 & n.17 (2000).
242 For similar reforms proposed in other litigation contexts, see Brianne J. Gorod, The
Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011).
243 See Coffee, supra note 241, at 376.
244 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
245 See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
246 This may be less disappointing than it initially appears: scholars have expressed
skepticism with respect to the efficacy of most class-action protections. See, e.g., Coffee,
supra note 241, at 371-72.
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are likely to represent a broader array of interests. Courts could, for example,
employ special masters and court-appointed experts in efforts to counteract the
biases and interests of the litigants.247 This approach has been used with
apparent success in jurisdictions such as Connecticut and New York.248 Courts
likewise could, as necessary, appoint counsel to advocate for potentially
meritorious positions that have been neglected by the parties.249 Such steps
would appear to constitute a measured response to the lack of
representativeness affecting redistricting litigation.250
To advance the second primary goal – reducing opportunities for procedural
manipulation – jurisdictions could pursue targeted reforms. Forum selection
provides a straightforward example. Granting litigants the ability to select
forum – that is, to influence who will serve as the judicial mediator between
them and the maps they seek to change – can reward procedural manipulation
in powerful ways. To counteract this effect, those interested in reform could
follow the lead of the minority of jurisdictions that already have enacted
redistricting-specific venue rules.251 This straightforward fix significantly
restricts the potential for forum-related manipulation.
Litigants’ ability to set court agendas through claim selection, by contrast,
poses a more challenging problem for the reform community. A potential
reform nevertheless may be modeled on what this Article refers to as claimforcing statutes. Though these are rare, claim-forcing statutes are potentially
effective counterweights where they apply. In Florida, for example, the state
constitution requires, with respect to certain district maps, that the Attorney
General petition the state supreme court “for a declaratory judgment
determining the validity of the apportionment” within fifteen days of its
passage.252 A narrower but more prominent example of a claim-forcing statute
is section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires that certain jurisdictions
obtain preclearance from the federal government prior to enforcing new district
maps.253 With respect to the limited question of retrogression at issue in these
section 5 proceedings, there is no escaping some form of federal review.
247

See Gorod, supra note 242 (discussing similar reforms in other litigation contexts).
See Order Directing Special Master, In re Petition of Reapportionment Commission,
36 A.3d 661 (Conn. Jan. 3, 2012), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/news/SC1890
7_010312.pdf; Persily, supra note 93, at 1148; Thomas Kaplan, Unmapped: Update on New
York Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2012, at A21.
249 Cf. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 273-74 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (Eisele, J.,
dissenting) (lamenting the failure of the parties to raise a particular claim).
250 It is true that the justiciability doctrines, if applied aggressively, may pose a bar to
increased court involvement. See, e.g., id. at 274 (“Even in public-interest lawsuits such as
this [redistricting lawsuit], there are limits upon the Court’s authority to sua sponte, take up
and deal with issues it sees in the case but which the parties choose to ignore.”). It may be
appropriate to apply these doctrines liberally where necessary to effectuate such reforms.
251 See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
252 FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c).
253 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006); see also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
248
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Although these sorts of requirements by no means remove litigant control, they
do limit the ability of redistricting litigants to pick and choose which claims
will be brought before the courts.
At first blush, claim-forcing statutes may be thought simply to increase the
influence of litigants by mandating that certain claims be adjudicated. Yet
these requirements only make a difference with respect to claims that no party
wants to raise, and, as a result, the statutes actually reduce the opportunity for
procedural manipulation of the process. Litigants no longer serve as the only
actors setting court agendas.
Reducing the manipulation associated with timing poses yet another
challenge. The difficulty is largely logistical: speed in redistricting is more
easily demanded than achieved, particularly when primary redistricting agents
fundamentally disagree on which approach to take (or which politicians to
favor) in redrawing district lines. In an effort to respond to the compression of
civil procedure that occurs in redistricting litigation – more precisely, to avoid
the aspects of this regime that prove highly vulnerable to litigant manipulation
– jurisdictions nevertheless might attempt, to the extent possible, to set
deadlines for redistricting that permit adequate time for litigation prior to the
start of the election cycle. To provide proper incentives, jurisdictions could
strip primary redistricting agents of the power to redistrict if they miss
deadlines. Fallback redistricting agents, in turn, might be required to begin
their own work as quickly as possible – perhaps even engaging in preliminary
map-drawing and legal argument before the deadlines have passed for the
primary redistricting agents.
This leads to a final, more general response to litigant influence, one that
addresses the approach courts might take toward the “unwelcome obligation”
of engaging in judicial redistricting.254 Stated succinctly, courts adjudicating
redistricting cases should consider engaging in a particularly aggressive form
of case management. Deference to litigant preferences – which seems less of a
priority than it might otherwise be when a court is participating in the
quintessentially public task of redistricting – might be reduced, with courts
more willing to act sua sponte in determining how the case should be run.255
To the extent this sort of regime would put courts in an unusual posture,
redistricting litigation seems to present a case for unusual treatment.
By embracing reforms of this sort, jurisdictions might help to minimize the
control litigants have over courts, bridge the divide between what litigants do
and what they seek to achieve, and otherwise counteract the potentially
corrosive effects of procedural manipulation.
In sum, there are a number of reforms potentially available to those seeking
to improve the litigant-dependent systems of fallback redistricting. Some seek
254

See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977).
Tellingly, many with first-hand experience recommend that redistricting courts
engage in aggressive case management. See, e.g., CLARKE & REAGAN, supra note 191, at 6871; Persily, supra note 93, at 1131, 1131-65.
255
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to address the concerns raised by litigation participation by reducing it; others
by regulating it. Jurisdictions should consider implementing a sensible
combination of both.
CONCLUSION
It has been now half a century since the Supreme Court first transformed
litigants into agents of redistricting. By creating a judicially based regime of
fallback redistricting, Baker v. Carr and its progeny ensured that the process
would depend on a diverse and largely self-selected group of participants to
dictate many important aspects of redistricting. Litigants now affect whether,
when, and how a given court will intervene.
Despite the extensive scholarly attention paid to courts’ involvement in the
redistricting process, litigants have not been recognized for what they are:
important and distinct agents of redistricting, upon whom the process relies,
who are capable of affecting redistricting in deliberate and potentially
outcome-determinative ways. For all involved in the redistricting process, the
dearth of analysis is a disservice, for the role of litigants must be understood
and acknowledged if the redistricting process is to operate in an effective,
transparent, and legitimate way.
To this end, it is important to recognize that the reliance on litigant
participation is not without consequences or costs. It produces a form of
litigation highly susceptible to procedural manipulation, which in turn puts in
place a form of redistricting controlled in fundamental ways by those who
choose to litigate. This arrangement gives rise to normative concerns. In the
absence of adequate regulation, litigant participation threatens to compromise
the outcomes, efficiency, and legitimacy of the redistricting process.
Targeted reforms, including those meant to reduce reliance on litigants and
those regulating their participation, may help to alleviate these problems.
In short, litigants are not bit players in the court-dominated supervision of
elections, and they should not be treated as such. Quite to the contrary, litigants
are powerful agents of redistricting, able to exercise control over the
redistricting process and its outcomes, whose efforts are authorized and
facilitated by the legal system itself. It therefore is critical to begin
recognizing, analyzing, and better regulating this particular delegation of
democratic design.

